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regulation, and the repetition of the same mistakes in the 
regulatory response to the crisis 
 
Riccardo de Caria1 
  
Abstract 
More than five years from the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the paper 
addresses two issues: how poor regulation has contributed to its origination, and how 
current regulatory responses to the crisis are (not) differing from the poor regulation 
that caused it. 
In the first part, the paper offers an overview of the most relevant examples of 
poor regulation that have arguably played a role in determining the crisis, with a focus 
on the US and the EU: from the institutional design of central banks (that influences 
the type of monetary policy they implement), to the rules at the basis of fractional 
reserve banking (a source of great systemic instability, according to the perspective 
adopted in the paper); from the prescriptions in the Basel Accords I and II (that 
strongly encouraged banks to invest in the "wrong" assets), to the several policies 
adopted by the US authorities to encourage the purchase of a house by American 
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households (resulted in a bubble whose burst triggered the global financial turmoil); 
from the regulatory requirements entrenching the oligopoly of credit rating agencies 
(more competition might have meant improved overall rating abilities), to the deposit 
insurance schemes (a source of great moral hazard and financial irresponsibility of 
consumers); from some shortcomings that can be identified in the way the institutions 
of the EU and of the Eurozone were designed (a major source of the current turmoil in 
this area), to the policies making the size of government grow, resulting in an increase 
of spending, taxation, deficit and public debt (something highly unhealthy for the 
economy from the perspective adopted in the paper), to some features of 
"regulation" narrowly meant (at best, an obstacle to the proper functioning of the 
markets). The concluding paragraph explains how all these failures might have led to 
the crisis, and reflects on what lessons can be derived from the inquiry made, what 
would be appropriate responses from legislators and regulators, and what mistakes it 
should be wise to avoid repeating: in particular, it is argued that definitely not more, 
but less regulation (and government intervention in general) is needed. 
In the second part, the lessons summarized in the former one are contrasted with 
the actual legislative and regulatory responses adopted by the US and the EU: from 
the changes in central banking (that not only have fallen short of reducing the power 
of central banks to manipulate money, but have instead entrusted these institutions 
with even more power), to (non-existent) changes in fractional reserve banking (that 
unfortunately has not been subject to any rethinking in the mainstream thought); 
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from the rules of Basel III (that do not seem to be truly capturing what went wrong 
with its two predecessors), to the still ongoing distortions of the real estate sector 
(GSEs were eventually bailed out and not surprisingly subprime mortgages seem to 
have resumed); from the legislative proposals in the field of credit rating agencies 
(that go as far as proposing the establishment of a public European-wide credit rating 
agency), to the EU agreement to set up a common deposit-insurance scheme (that will 
probably encourage consumers' recklessness to an even greater extent than national 
schemes); from the many attempts to fine-tune the European architecture (that do 
not seem bound to remedy the identified pre-crisis shortcomings), to the many 
decisions further increasing spending, taxation, deficit and public debt (thus putting 
recovery at stake), to the new flood of "regulation" (narrowly meant) that has struck 
the markets (all but helping them to restore their ordinary functioning). The final 
paragraph offers some reflections on what is the role that law and regulation should 
instead play in financial markets, and argues that it should be confined to a set of 
clear, broad and general principles, giving up the idea of pre-determining the outcome 
of the competitive game, but simply dictating its rules, in the spirit of Hayek's lesson in 
the first volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
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I. POOR REGULATION IN PLACE WHEN THE CRISIS HIT: ERRARE 
HUMANUM EST 
 
 
 
rom a certain respect, this is an impossible article: as was effectively written, 
"[w]ith the exception of health care, financial services is the most highly 
regulated industry in America (and, generally speaking, in all developed 
countries)"2. Because the forms of regulatory interference with the ordinate flow of 
financial markets are so incredibly numerous, dealing extensively with all of them 
would require much more than a paper. Hopefully, a similar endeavour might be 
attempted in the future. 
Our more modest, but more manageable goal in this article is therefore trying to 
give an overview of the main examples of (poor) financial regulation that, according to 
the view subscribed to in here3, have contributed to originating the crisis, and are now 
                                                 
2 Jeremy O'Driscoll, Regulatory Failure, in ThinkMarkets, 19 January 2009. 
3 Essentially, it is the position of the so called Austrian school of economics, that offers a consistent 
reading of the past crises and the current one, looking at them as the inevitable "busts" that follow a period 
of artificial "boom" in the economic cycle, generated by different forms of government intervention and 
stimulus. Among several scholars of the past and present times that hold "Austrian" views, the French 
economist Pascal Salin is the one to which this work is particularly indebted: see in particular his book 
Revenir au capitalisme... pour éviter les crises (Odile Jacob, Paris 2009), surprisingly (and unfortunately) 
not (yet) translated into English (the literal translation of the title is: Coming back to capitalism... in order 
to avoid crises). Among the books in English, see in particular Harry C. Veryser, It Didn't Have to be This 
Way: Why Boom and Bust is Unnecessary–and How the Austrian School of Econoics Breaks the Cycle 
(ISI Books, Wilminton 2013); Philipp Bagus, The Tragedy of the Euro (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
Auburn 2012 [2010]); David Beckworth (ed.), Boom and Bust Banking. The Causes and Cures of the 
Great Recession (The Independent Institute, Oakland 2012)); Johan Norberg, Financial Fiasco: How 
America's Infatuation with Home Ownership and Easy Money Created the Economic Crisis (Cato 
Institute, Washington DC 2012); several essays in Jeffrey Friedman (ed.), What Caused the Financial 
Crisis? (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2011) and the book by the same Jeffrey Friedman 
and Wladimir Kraus, Engineering the Financial Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation 
F 
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contributing to making it worse. 
Our focus is on the US and on the EU (mostly the Eurozone); because of their 
typical soft-law nature, regulatory efforts at the global level are generally left out of 
the analysis, except for some instances (in particular, the Basel Accord rules), that 
were implemented by national or EU (hard) law or regulation and have had a major 
impact on our topic. 
Our attempt is to provide a unitary reading of the regulatory sources of the crisis: 
obviously, the areas considered have rather different legal systems, and more 
importantly, as we shall see, the path that led them to their respective crises was 
quite different. However, we are persuaded that it is possible to identify an underlying 
unitary thread in the long series of regulatory failures that has been afflicting both the 
US and Europe, and that is arguably responsible for the financial turmoil that both 
                                                                                                                                               
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2011); Antony P. Muller, The Origins of the Crisis, in 
Thomas E. Woods Jr. (ed.), Back on the Road to Serfdom: The Resurgence of Statism (ISI Books, 
Wilmington 2011), 55-72; Kevin Dowd, Martin Hutchinson, Alchemists of Loss: How Modern Finance 
and Government Intervention Crashed the Financial System (Wiley, Hoboken 2010) (but see Roger W. 
Garrison's review of this book, Alchemy Leveraged: The Federal Reserve and Modern Finance, 16(3) 
Independent Review, 435-451 [2012]); Thomas E. Woods Jr., Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the 
Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse 
(Regnery Publishing, Washington 2009) (by this latter author, see also . See also the papers by Steven 
Horwtiz, Causes and Cures of the Great Recession (IEA Discussion Paper No. 40, July 2012); George 
Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, Lawrence H. White, Has the Fed Been a Failure? (Cato Working Paper 
No. 2, December 2010); Arnold Kling, Not What They Had in Mind: A History of Policies that Produced 
the Financial Crisis of 2008, Mercatus Center (September 2009); Mark A. Calabria, Did Deregulation 
Cause the Financial Crisis?, 31(4) Cato Policy Report (July/August 2009); Antony P. Muller, The 
Failures of International Financial Crisis Management, available at 
http://mises.org/journals/scholar/hayek6.PDF; and the articles in the issue of the Cato Journal (32(2), 
Spring/Summer 2012), on Monetary Reform in the Wake of Crisis. A book self-portraying as very much 
Austrian-friendly is the one by John A. Allison, The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure: Why 
Pure Capitalism is the World Economy’s Only Hope (McGraw-Hill, New York 2012); however, it should 
be considered that some strong Austrian critique was brought against this work in a review for the Mises 
Institute by David Gordon, You Call That Austrian?, Mises Daily, 7 November 2012. Finally, among non-
Austrian literature, a work that from surprisingly many respects is in line with the thesis of this article is 
the one by John B. Taylor, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, 
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have been experiencing. 
In this first Part, we review what we believe are the most significant pre-crisis 
regulatory failures: from central banking and its paraphernalia to fractional reserve 
banking, from the Basel Accords to the housing market policies adopted in the US, 
from the rules governing the activity of credit rating agencies to the ones establishing 
deposit insurance schemes, from some shortcomings in the European institutional 
engineering to the policies making the size of government grow (and therefore 
increasing the amount of spending, taxation, deficit and sovereign debt), to some 
features of "regulation" narrowly meant.  
We conclude by trying to explain how all these failures might have led to the crisis, 
and what lessons we can derive from this inquiry. Our bottom-line is that too much 
regulation, not too little, was the problem. 
In Part II, we move on to a summary of the most relevant regulatory responses to 
the crisis in the same areas considered under Part I: in the final paragraph, we then 
contrast such responses with the lessons drawn in Part I: our conclusion is that 
legislators and financial regulators all over the US and Europe are persisting in the 
same mistakes made before the crisis.  
We read what they have been doing trough the lens of Friedrich von Hayek's 
reflections on law in Rules and Order, the first volume of his Law, Legislation and 
Liberty: we find indeed a great predominance of what Hayek termed as the "law of 
legislation" over what he described as the "law of liberty", and identify this as the 
                                                                                                                                               
Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 2009). 
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primary explanation of why the conspicuous efforts made by legislators and regulators 
to constrain the markets have been quite unsuccessful in restoring growth, stability 
and confidence. 
Before starting our analysis, one caveat is needed: in this article, we take the word 
"regulation" in its broadest meaning, essentially as a synonym of government 
intervention in the economy. Some would argue that this is too broad a meaning, but 
in our view every way the government interferes with the market, from taxation to 
public monopolies, can appropriately be conceptualized and described as a way to 
direct the market, to steer it, to lead it towards a desired outcome, to limit it, to 
redress it: in one word, indeed, to regulate it. 
 
         I.A. THE MANIPULATION OF MONEY BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: CENTRAL BANKING 
We believe that all the aspects that we have chosen to consider are crucial in 
explaining how regulatory interference undermined the creation of a healthy 
spontaneous order4 in the markets. But undoubtedly the most important aspect of all 
is the role played by central banking and its "manipulation" of money5. 
By central banking we refer to the existence of government-appointed institutions 
                                                 
4 For an inquiry into the history of this notion, that was elaborated by several authors over the centuries, 
one of the most prominent of which is Friedrich von Hayek, see Nigel Ashford, Spontaneous Order. 
Freedom Creates Order in Society, 49(7) The Freeman (1999), available at 
http://www.thefreemanonline.org/features/spontaneous-order/. 
5 On the Manipulation of Money and Credit is the title of a collection of essays by Ludwig von Mises 
(The Mises Institute, Auburn 2002). For a historical analysis, see Murray N. Rothbard, A History of 
Money and Banking in the United States: The Colonial Era to World War II (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
Auburn 2002 [2002]); specifically with a lawyer's focus, see James Willard Hurst, A Legal History of 
Money in the United States, 1774-1970 (University of Nebraska Press 1973). 
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that are granted the monopoly over the issuance of money, on its turn sanctioned by 
the rules forbidding any other private entity to issue its own competing currency6, and 
sometimes – as was the case in the US in 1930s' – even outlawing gold payment 
clauses in contracts7 and gold possession by private individuals8 (both such policies 
were discontinued later9, but their effect could not be undone, and by that time 
fiduciary money had prevailed). Having the monopoly over money, central banks have 
the widely discretionary power to decide how much of this money to issue, thus 
determining the level of the money supply circulating in a certain country (monetary 
policy). And coherently with the fact that the currency created by central banks is the 
only form of "legal" money, such money is then typically declared to be legal tender, 
that is to say creditors cannot lawfully refuse payment in that currency, and taxes 
                                                 
6 In the US, this is the result of An Act to authorize Payments in Stamps and to prohibit Circulation of 
Notes of less Denomination than One Dollar (37th Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 196, 12 Stat. 592, July 17, 
1862), whose s. 2 stipulated that "no private corporation, banking association, firm or individual shall 
make, issue, circulate or pay any note, check, memorandum, token or other obligation, for a sum less than 
$1, intended to circulate as money or to be received or used in lieu of lawful money of the United States". 
7 This was done by the Gold Repeal Joint Resolution (Joint Resolution to assure uniform value to the 
coins and currencies of the United States (73rd Congress, Session I, Ch. 48, Pub. Res. No. 10, 48 Stat. 
112, June 5, 1933). 
8 This is what was done with the Executive Order 6102, Requiring Gold Coin, Gold Bullion and Gold 
Certificates to Be Delivered to the Government, issued on the 5th of April 1933 by President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt: it "prohibit[ed] the hoarding of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates within the 
continental United States by individuals, partnerships, associations and corporations". Roosevelt's 
Executive Order was overcome by the even stricter Gold Reserve Act of 1934 (An Act To protect the 
currency system of the United States, to provide for the better use of the monetary gold stock of the 
United States, and for other purposes, Pub.L. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337, January 30, 1934); see Henry Mark 
Holzer, How Americans Lost Their Right To Own Gold And Became Criminals in the Process, available 
at 
http://www.fame.org/pdf/Holzer%20Henry%20Mark%20How%20Americans%20Lost%20Their%20Righ
t%20to%20Own%20Gold.pdf. 
9 Respectively by An Act To authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to invest public moneys, and for 
other purposes (Pub. L. 95-147, 91 Stat. 1227, 1229, Oct. 28, 1977, s. 4(c), originally codified under 31 
USC 463, recodified as amended under 31 USC 5118(d)(2)), and by An Act to provide for increased 
participation by the United States in the International Development Association and to permit United 
States citizens to purchase, hold, sell, or otherwise deal with gold in the United States or abroad Pub. L. 
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must be paid using that currency10. 
The desirability and legitimacy of a system of central banking has been the subject 
of considerable debate. In our perspective, monetary policy is an extremely dangerous 
tool in the hands of those who handle it, and should be rejected – from a theoretical 
point of view – as should any form of government monopoly. Very simply, the 
objection to government monopolies derives from the trust in the competitive process 
to better serve the consumers' needs. 
As for any other good – money, indeed, is a good11 –, money production should be 
better left to the cares of different competing issuers, which would likely result in 
sounder and more stable money, as it happened during the centuries before its 
progressive corruption12 and the rise of central banking13. 
                                                                                                                                               
93-373, 88 Stat. 445, August 14, 1974. 
10 See for instance, in the US, s. 102 of the Coinage Act of 1965 (An Act To provide for the coinage of 
the United States, Pub.L. 89-91, 79 Stat. 254, July 23, 1965), a provision now slightly amended and 
codified in 31 USC 5103, with the following text: "United States coins and currency (including Federal 
reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all 
debts, public charges, taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts". In the 
Eurozone, see Article 128 TFEU, and Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 may 1998 on 
the introduction of the euro, OJ EC 11.5.98, L 139/1: "As from 1 January 2002, the ECB and the central 
banks of the participating Member States shall put into circulation banknotes denominated in euro. 
[T]hese banknotes denominated in euro shall be the only banknotes which have the status of legal tender 
in all these Member States"; Art. 10 is then complemented by national rules establishing the prohibition 
for creditors to refuse payments in legal tender currency: for instance, in Italy see Art. 1277, § 1 of the 
civil code ("Pecuniary obligations shall be paid off with currency having legal tender in the State at the 
time of the payment and at its face value"). 
11 Ludwig von Mises, The Theory of Money and Credit (Yale University Press, New Haven 1953 
[1912]), especially Part One (The Nature of Money), pp. 29-94, and in particular Chapter V (Money as an 
Economic Good), pp. 79-90; see also the fundamental studies by Carl Menger, Principles of Economics 
(Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 2007 [1871]), especially Chapter VIII (The Theory of Money), pp. 
257-285. 
12 In this unfortunate process, an important role was played by the Supreme Court, as examined 
extensively by Richard H. Timberlake, Constitutional Money: A Review of the Supreme Court's Monetary 
Decisions (Cambridge University Press, New York 2013). 
13 The case against government monopoly on money was most famously made by Friedrich von Hayek in 
his Denationalisation of Money (Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1990 [1976]); see also, among 
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In fact, leaving money in the hands of monopolistic institutions affords them the 
power to debase the currency – by issuing more units of it – any time they wish so, as 
again history shows they did repeatedly and with no effective restraint14. Not only 
does this inflation15 impoverish those who hold money and therefore discourage 
savings, but it also alters the ability of entrepreneurs to evaluate the return of 
investments: the artificial growth of money makes money cheaper, and cheap money 
makes investments look more attractive to the entrepreneur than they actually are. 
However, sooner or later the bubble of only apparently good investments bursts, and 
such operations reveal themselves as bad investments, or malinvestments16. 
This is not just an hypothesis: arguably, it is precisely the most credible explanation 
of what caused the 2008 financial crisis in the US17. To the exact opposite of the 
beliefs he had held in previous years18, Alan Greenspan, during his chairmanship at 
the Federal Reserve, systematically pursued a low interest-rate policy, and – just like 
Austrian economists, several decades before, had expected it would happen19 – this 
                                                                                                                                               
many, by Hayek, Choice in Currency: A Way to Stop Inflation (Institute of Economic Affairs, London 
1976), and by Kevin Dowd, Private Money: The Path to Monetary Stability (Institute of Economic 
Affairs, London 1988). An interesting inquiry into the Legal Aspects of Local Currency was also made in 
Chapter 7 of Lewis D. Solomon, Rethinking Our Centralized Monetary System. The Case for a System of 
Local Currencies (Praeger Publishers, Westport 1996), pp. 95-128. 
14 See Murray N. Rothbard, What Has Government Done to Our Money? (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
Auburn 2005 [1963]), in particular Chapter IV (The Monetary Breakdown of the West), pp. 85-107. 
15 For Austrian economists, "the essence of inflation is not a general rise in prices but an increase in the 
supply of money, which in turns sets in motion a general increase in the prices of goods and services" 
(Frank Shostak, Defining Inflation, Mises Daily, 6 March 2002, http://mises.org/daily/908/). 
16 For a comprehensive explanation of the notion of malinvestment, see Larry J. Sechrest, Explaining 
Malinvestment and Overinvestment, in 9(4) Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 27 (2006). 
17 This case was made extensively in a book by David Beckworth (ed), Boom and Bust Banking. The 
Causes and Cures of the Great Recession (The Independent Institute, Oakland 2012). 
18 See in particular his 1966 article Gold and Economic Freedom, published in the newsletter The 
Objectivist. 
19 Among them, see especially Mises, with his already mentioned Theory of Money and Credit, and 
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eventually ended up in a bust. 
From this perspective, central banking – an actually failed experiment20 – is the 
most important form of regulation that should be repealed21. More realistically, and 
perhaps more interestingly for lawyers, attention can be paid also to the possible ways 
to constrain the discretion that – as we said – central banks usually enjoy when 
deciding their monetary policies. Indeed, in spite of the efforts of even some 
prominent politicians22, the abolition of central banking may be an extremely long way 
down the road, therefore it seems useful, in the meanwhile, to reflect on the possible 
ways to limit the potential damages arising from a misguided monetary policy23. In 
fact, legislators themselves seem aware of the risk that central bankers abuse of their 
powers, therefore they have taken measures in all countries in an attempt to tie their 
hands. 
The typical path followed has been to pre-determine central banks' goals and 
discretionary powers by way of legislation or even constitutional provisions. So, 
according to s. 2A of the Federal Reserve Act24, the Fed has the institutional mandate 
                                                                                                                                               
Friedrich von Hayek, with his Prices and Production (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, New York 1967 
[1931]). 
20 See the analysis by George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, Lawrence H. White, Has the Fed been a 
failure?, in 34(3) Journal of Macroeconomics (September 2012) 569-596. 
21 Following our premise in § I.I, we consider central banking a form of regulation in the sense the 
monetary policy regulates the amount of circulating money. 
22 Most notably US Congressman from Texas Ron Paul, who has been campaigning for many years in 
order to End the Fed, as says the title of his best-selling book (Grand Central Publishing, New York 
2009). 
23 See the thoughtful analysis on this crucial issue by Peter J. Boettke, Daniel J. Smith, Monetary Policy 
and the Quest for Robust Political Economy (paper presented at the 9th Mises Seminar of the Bruno 
Leoni Institute, 7 October 2012). 
24 12 USC 225a, added to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 by the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977 
(Title II of An Act To extend the authority for the flexible regulation of interest rates on deposits and 
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to "promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates"; in Europe, in order to reassure the Germans that 
ordinary legislation would not be enough to amend them, the goals of the ECB were 
written in primary law, i.e. in the Treaties: Art. 119(2) TFEU (as well as Art. 127(1) TFEU 
and Art. 2 of Protocol No. 4) stipulates that the "primary objective" of the single 
monetary policy and of the ESCB "shall be to maintain price stability". 
There are obviously some considerable differences between the two formulas, and 
this has given rise to much debate too (in particular, much has been written about the 
Fed's dual mandate, comprising also the promotion of full employment, as opposed to 
the ECB's only goal of maintaining price stability). But what matters here is that both 
provisions share the intent to limit the respective central banks' powers, trying to 
ensure that they act to offer stability to the economy, and in particular that they keep 
prices stable. However, in the years leading up to the crisis, this expectation was not 
fulfilled, especially in the US, where the Fed acted to boost the economy, eventually 
putting stability at stake (its dual mandate certainly helped it in justifying this policy). 
As we shall see, in the post-crisis years the record is even worse, for both the Fed and 
the ECB, in spite of the fact that the ECB only has a single mandate25. 
                                                                                                                                               
accounts in depository institutions, to promote the accountability of the Federal Reserve System, and for 
other purposes, Pub.L. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1387, November 16, 1977), s. 202. 
25 For a general analysis of the institutional differences between the ECB and the Fed (and also of the 
Bank of Japan), see, among many Dieter Gerdesmeier, Francesco Paolo Mongelli, Barbara Roffia, The 
Eurosystem, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan. Similarities and Differences (ECB Working 
Paper Series No 742, March 2007), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp742.pdf; in any 
case, Philipp Bagus, The Fed and the ECB: Two Paths, One Goal, Mises Daily, 9 September 2011, 
persuasively argues that the differences between the two institutions eventually had no relevant 
consequence on their actions (see also Chapter Seven [Diff erences in the Money Creation of the Fed and 
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Moving on to consider the institutional architecture of central banks, as was said 
their high officials are normally appointed by governments: this is true in the US26 as 
well as in the Eurozone27. Once appointed, the heads of central banks are granted a 
considerable amount of independence from the governments: legislators are usually 
well aware of the temptation for the latter to exert pressure on the central bankers so 
that they make money cheaper and thus stimulate the economy for a while (until the 
next election!). Therefore, typically central banks are devised as independent 
institutions, that do not receive government instructions. 
However, one could also make the case that such a great power should not be 
removed from the democratic legitimacy circuit: since central banks can make them a 
lot poorer by the year, people should at least be allowed to directly vote for whom 
they want to entrust this power to (or, for whom they consider least likely to actually 
impoverish them). 
No system of central banking is devised in this way, though. Here, the underlying 
problem is the counter-majoritarian paradox28, typical of judicial review of legislation 
and of constitutionalism more broadly: we need to prevent people from 
democratically taking decisions that would imperil democracy, or in other words from 
                                                                                                                                               
the ECB] of Bagus's The Tragedy of the Euro, pp. 81-89). 
26 S. 10 of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (An Act To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve 
banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a 
more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes, 63rd Congress, Sess. 
II, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, December 23, 1913). 
27 Article 283(2) TFEU. 
28 See broadly Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw, Barry R. Weingast, Democratization and 
Countermajoritarian Institutions. Power and Constitutional Design in Self-Enforcing Democracy, in Tom 
Ginsburg (ed.), Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge University Press, New York 2012), pp. 
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freely taking decisions with which they would harm themselves. As some fundamental 
principles and rules are subtracted from the democratic game and cannot be 
amended by ordinary laws, and as some unelected wise men are appointed in order to 
make sure that the political majority is not able to circumvent this barrier, in the same 
way some supposedly enlightened economists are appointed by governments in order 
to determine which "price is right" for money. 
The reasons to prevent people from democratically deciding that money should be 
cheaper and cheaper are quite sound; but also the arguments in favour of letting 
people decide on a matter of such a great relevance to their wealth should not be 
underestimated. The conundrum seems to be without solution, so the only possible 
way out seems to open up the market for money and leave it to the free market to 
issue currency, de-nationalizing money production, and allowing for several competing 
currencies to fight in order to win the favour of their users, as advocated by Hayek29. 
Clearly, this would require also the repeal of the already mentioned rules 
establishing a legal tender, i.e. the rules according to which only the currency issued 
by the central bank is the accepted – the legal – form of money, therefore payments 
in that specie cannot be legitimately refused, and government taxes must be paid 
using that specie. Indeed such a rule, driving out all other forms of money (even when 
they remain legal), allows the government to manipulate money, giving it the power 
to artificially set its value. 
                                                                                                                                               
69-100. 
29 See above, note 12. 
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In the past, such power used to be mitigated by the pegging of currencies to gold 
(or silver), in what is commonly referred to as the gold standard. Under gold standard, 
the circulating money no longer corresponded to the amount of precious metals 
stored in the vaults of bankers, as it was at the beginning of banking: circulating 
money eventually became several times more than the actual gold deposited at 
central banks, that kept issuing (actually: 'printing') deposit certificates even if they 
were not backed by actual wealth. However, there was still a link between the two, a 
standard ratio that pegged paper money to real gold30. 
But when in 1971 US President Richard Nixon unilaterally abandoned the 
convertibility of dollar into gold31, the road was completely clear for governments to 
decide with total discretion the value of money. Money became completely "fiat", i.e. 
dependent on an act of will by the government, that could manipulate it according to 
its needs. 
Obviously, this does not mean that governments (to be sure, monetary authorities, 
but as we hinted at, the difference is often imperceptible) will necessarily abuse of 
such a power of theirs: they could decide to be very conservative in this field and 
adopt a tight monetary policy, defending the value of their currency (and in fact even 
the Fed pursued a "relatively sound monetary policy"32 from around 1950 and for 
                                                 
30 For an in-depth analysis, see for example Joseph T. Salerno, Money, Sound and Unsound (Ludwig von 
Mises Institute 2010), Part Three, pp. 323-419. 
31 By way of a simple announcement: it is quite remarkable how a decision of such huge (and 
devastating) economic consequences was taken de facto, without finding its way into a legally binding 
piece of legislation. 
32 In the words of Mark A. Calabria, Did Glass-Steagall Put a Man on the Moon?, Cato@Liberty, 29 
July 2012. 
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about two decades). However, loosening the monetary policy typically boosts the 
economy in the short term, and this helps to win re-election. The public school choice 
insights33 tell us that it is therefore very likely that, sooner or later, governments will 
not resist pressuring monetary authorities for cheap money, unable to resist the 
temptation to "buy" their way into re-election, by lowering the cost of credit and thus 
stimulating the economy. 
As we saw, constitutional architects usually try to overcome this problem by 
entrusting monetary policy to independent entities, but independence seems to be 
often more apparent than real, because for many reasons central banks end up doing 
what political bodies ask them to do. This was true in the US before (and after) the 
crisis. As we shall see, it has proven to be equally true in Europe, especially after the 
crisis hit. 
One last important point to make is that the Federal Reserve System is also 
responsible for creating the expectation in large financial firms, that they would be 
bailed out in case they took excessive risks and ran into trouble: indeed, in 1998 the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York created a very dangerous precedent with the 
bailout of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund, an operation that must 
have been very reassuring for investment bankers at Wall Street in the years of the 
subprime bubble, dramatically increasing the incentives for moral hazard34. 
                                                 
33 See in particular the groundbreaking The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1962). 
34 This argument was made for instance by Tyler Cowen, Bailout of Long-Term Capital: A Bad 
Precedent?, in The New York Times, December 26, 2008. 
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I.B THE MANIPULATION OF MONEY BY BANKS: FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING 
 
Another source of great systemic instability lies in the way modern banking itself 
has evolved. Indeed money is manipulated not only by central banks that are allowed 
to 'print' as much money as they deem appropriate: private banks can do essentially 
the same. It all started when the bankers, who until then had acted as true depositors 
of precious metals (i.e. of real money), started lending out more (paper) money – in 
the form of paper certificates – than the amount of gold or silver they actually held, 
counting on the fact that depositors would not normally show up to redeem their gold 
or silver all at the same time. 
This amounted to a form of money creation "out of thin air"35, and when it was 
initially discovered, depositors perceived it as a fraud36: they had handed their gold to 
bankers because they had stipulated a contract of deposit with them, but in fact 
bankers treated it as a loan, and started lending out that gold without permission, and 
even artificially multiplying it by way of paper certificates. 
This operation, initially perceived as a fraud, gradually became the normal practice 
of banking, and was definitively sanctioned by the rise of central banks: while under 
                                                 
35 To use Rothbard's words in his The Mistery of Banking (Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 2008 
[1983]), p. 98. 
36 See broadly Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Jörg Guido Hülsmann, Walter Block, Against Fiduciary Media, 
1(1) Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics (1998), 19, available at 
http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae1_1_2.pdf. 
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the previous system of free banking37, a bank inflating its notes would soon go 
bankrupt, because there was no one out there to bail it out, central banking, with its 
lender of last resort function, prevented the fraud to be called, and allowed for a 
contextual creation of money out of thin air by all banks38. 
So fractional reserve banking became perfectly legal39: in some countries, its 
conditio sine qua non, i.e. that the contract between the depositor and the bank was 
not to be deemed a deposit but a loan (therefore the bank acquired ownership of the 
money deposited), was even explicitly written down into the law: for instance, Article 
1834 of the Italian civil code stipulates that «in deposits of a sum of money at a bank, 
the bank acquires ownership of that sum, and shall return it in the same currency». 
The legitimacy of fractional reserve banking is debated even among Austrian 
scholars: some, like Jesús Huerta de Soto40, Thorsten Polleit41, and Rothbard42 before 
                                                 
37 One of the most detailed studies of free banking is the one by Larry J. Sechrest, Free Banking. Theory, 
History, and a Laissez-Faire Model (Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 2008 [1993]). 
38 Rothbard claimed indeed that central banking amounted to a government 'cartelization' of the banking 
industry: Murray N. Rothbard, Fractional Reserve Banking: Part II, 45(10) The Freeman (October 1995). 
39 Three British cases were crucial in getting to this conclusion: first, in Carr v Carr (1811), the House of 
Lords ruled that the money deposited in a bank by a person amounted to a debt of the banker towards this 
person's heirs; then, in Sims v Bond (1833), the House of Lords clearly stated that bank deposits are 
actually to be considered loans made by the “depositor” to the bank; and finally, in 1848 the English 
justices stated outright that «Money, when paid into a bank, ceases altogether to be the money of the 
principal; it is then the money of the banker, who is bound to an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that 
deposited with him when he is asked for it. […] The money placed in the custody of a banker is, to all 
intents and purposes, the money of the banker, to do with it as he pleases; he is guilty of no breach of trust 
in employing it; he is not answerable to the principal if he puts it into jeopardy, if he engages in hazardous 
speculation; he is not bound to keep it or deal with it as the property of his principal; but he is, of course, 
answerable for the amount, because he has contracted». 
40 Jesús Huerta de Soto, A Critical Analysis of Central Banks and Fractional-Reserve Free Banking 
from the Austrian Perspective, 8(2) Review of Austrian Economics 25 (1995); Money, Bank Credit, and 
Economic Cycles (Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 2012 [1998]), especially the first three chapters. 
41 Thorsten Polleit, The Faults of Fractional-Reserve Banking, in Mises Daily, December 23, 2010. 
42 Murray N. Rothbard, in his already mentioned The Mystery of Banking (in particular pp. 94-103), 
Fractional Reserve Banking: Part II, and What Has Government Done to Our Money? pp. 42 ff; but also 
The Case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar, in Leland Yeager (ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution 
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them, are extremely critical of it, while others argue that it would be legitimate if the 
depositor freely and knowingly decided to conclude a fractional reserve contract with 
the bank43. 
Certainly, fractional reserve banking calls into question the notion of property: can 
two people own the same good at the same time? In particular: can a depositor 
dispose of the money he deposited, while at the same time that very money is lent 
out many times to other people? The fiction of fractional reserve banking as we know 
it is founded on the assumption that this is possible. It is in fact hard to believe that 
this is true by way of a simple statute that declares this possible. The question 
whether two people can freely and knowingly conclude a fractional reserve contract – 
under a system of free banking – is more difficult. 
But even if we concluded that fractional reserve banking would not be a problem 
under a system of free banking, certainly, when it is coupled with a fiat money system 
run by central banks, like the one we are used to, it massively magnifies the 
imbalances of such system, making the castle of cards of fiat money many times bigger 
and more precarious, and thus amounting to a major ingredient of the global collapse. 
Without going into details, it is sufficient to recall that, in the US, "[r]eserve 
requirements were first established at the national level in 1863 with the passage of 
                                                                                                                                               
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1962, pp. 94-136). 
43 Most notably Mises in his Theory of Money and Credit (in particular, Part Three, Money and 
Banking, pp. 261 ff.); in current times, see the very clear discussion by Detlev S. Schlichter, Paper Money 
Collapse: The Folly of Elastic Money and the Coming Monetary Breakdown (Wiley, Hoboken 2011), in 
particular Chapter II (The Fundamentals of Fractional-Reserve Banking). 
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the National Bank Act"44; the power to adjust them as an instrument of monetary 
policy was entrusted to the Fed for the first time in 1935 (even though within certain 
limits)45, the requirements subsequently changed many times, and in particular they 
started being progressively decreased, especially between 1980 and 199046. 
As for the ECB, under art. 19(1) of its Statute, it "may require credit institutions 
established in Member States to hold minimum reserve on accounts with the ECB and 
national central banks". Relying on this provision, and on the implementing Council 
Regulations (EC) No. 2531/98 and 2532/98 of 23 November 1998, respectively 
concerning the application of minimum reserves by the European Central Bank47 and 
concerning the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions48, the ECB 
issued its Regulation No. 2818/98 of 1 December 1998 on the application of minimum 
reserves49. Art. 4 of this Regulation introduced a 0% reserve ratio on: "(a) deposits 
with agreed maturity over two years; (b) deposits redeemable at notice over two 
years; (c) repos; (d) debt securities issued with an agreed maturity over two years"; for 
all other liabilities, the reserve requirement was set at the level of 2% (as we shall see, 
this latter level was cut to 1% since January 2012). 
 
                                                 
44 Joshua N. Feinman, Reserve Requirements: History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform, in 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (June 1993), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/0693lead.pdf, p. 572. 
45 Susan Hoffmann, Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of Financial 
Institutions (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2001), p. 136. 
46 Feinman, Reserve Requirements: History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform, pp. 578 ff. 
47 OJ L 318, 27 November 1998, p. 1. 
48 OJ L 318, 27 November 1998, p. 4. 
49 BCE/1998/15, GUCE L 356/1 of 20 December 1998. 
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I.C BASEL I AND BASEL II 
Not to be confused with the reserve requirements dealt with in the previous 
paragraph are the capital requirements included in the so called Basel Accords, that 
concentrate on the amount of capital that investment banks must hold, against the 
assets in which they invested. Indeed, exactly as they do with loans against deposits, 
banks that engage in investments do invest much more than the actual capital they 
hold: just as fractional reserve banking (at least under a non-free banking system), this 
generates a great systemic risk. 
 And just like reserve requirements, that, together with deposit insurance schemes 
(see below, § I.F), are the remedy devised by regulators in order to face the risk of 
bank runs, capital requirements are introduced in order to make sure that banks 
always have a sufficient buffer of capital available in case of a sudden deterioration of 
the value of their assets (corresponding to an increase in the risk to which they are 
exposed): in particular, Basel I established that such capital reserve should be the 8% 
of the invested assets. 
Clearly, the assets do not all carry the same amount of risk: to take that into 
account, Basel I stipulated that the assets had to be risk-weighted, namely that some 
of them – deemed particularly safe – did not require an increase in the capital 
requirements, while others required the full 8% reserve. In the middle ground, there 
were other categories50. 
                                                 
50 The text of the Accord, of July 1988, updated to April 1998, can be read at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf; it was originally implemented in the US by the Risk-Based Capital 
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In this way, investment banks had an extremely high incentive to invest in the 
securities that enjoyed a preferential treatment from the Basel Accord and whose 
purchase did not require to set aside capital, while they faced a specular disincentive 
to invest in the assets classified at the other end of the spectrum. The problem is that 
the preferred assets were cash and bonds of central banks and governments of OECD 
countries, deemed to have a 0% risk of credit (i.e. there was supposed to be no risk at 
all that they would not be repaid), while the riskiest investment, according to Basel I, 
were corporate bonds, requiring a 100% (of the 8%) reserve. 
In retrospect, considering that the current epicentre of the crisis lies with European 
sovereign bonds, this looks like a spectacular regulatory failure, and quite ironic 
indeed. 
The shortcomings of Basel I were even worsened in the US by the adoption of the 
so called 'recourse rule'51, i.e. the one that "extended the accord's risk differentiations 
to asset-backed securities (ABS): bonds backed by credit card debt, or car loans — or 
mortgages — required a mere 2 percent capital cushion, as long as these bonds were 
rated AA or AAA or were issued by a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), such as 
                                                                                                                                               
Guidelines, in 54 Federal Register 4168, 4177, January 27, 1989 (12 CFR Part 3 appendix A), by the 
Minimum Capital Ratios, in 55 Federal Register 38797, 38800, September 21, 1990 (12 CFR § 3.6(c)), 
and most importantly by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub.L. 
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253, December 19, 1991 (12 USC § 1831o) (see also 12 CFR Part 6) (as for 
what was then the European Economic Community the EU, the Member States that was also members of 
the BIS implemented it with national rules). 
51 Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Risk-
Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance: Capital Treatment of 
Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations. Final Rule, in 66 
Federal Register 230, 59614 (November 29, 2001) (12 CFR Part 3, 12 CFR Parts 208 and 225, 12 CFR 
Part 325, 12 CFR Part 567). 
 Revista da Associação Mineira de Direito e Economia 
 
201 
 
Fannie or Freddie. Thus, where a well-capitalized commercial bank needed to devote 
$10 of capital to $100 worth of commercial loans or corporate bonds, or $5 to $100 
worth of mortgages, it needed to spend only $2 of capital on a mortgage-backed 
security (MBS) worth $100. A bank interested in reducing its capital cushion — also 
known as "leveraging up" — would gain a 60 percent benefit from trading its 
mortgages for MBSs and an 80 percent benefit for trading its commercial loans and 
corporate securities for MBSs"52. This rule, part of a decade-long policy by the US 
authorities to favour home-ownership by the American citizens, was meant to 
encourage the purchase of homes. However, it substantially contributed to the 
tremendous housing bubble whose burst was the outbreak of the financial crisis in the 
US (see the next paragraph). 
Basel II53 attempted to correct some of the features that had proved to be highly 
                                                 
52 Jeffrey Friedman, A Perfect Storm of Ignorance, Cato Policy Report, January/February 2010, 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v32n1/cpr32n1-1.html. Friedman and his pupil Wladimir Kraus 
are among those who devoted most attention to studying the impact of the recourse rule: see their joint 
paper, A Silver Lining to the Financial Crisis: A More Realistic View of Capitalism (American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, N. 1, January 2010, http://www.aei.org/outlook/society-and-
culture/free-enterprise/a-silver-lining-to-the-financial-crisis/), and their book Engineering the Financial 
Crisis: Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation. 
53 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: a Revised Framework (June 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf 
(see also the comprehensive version, updated to June 2006, at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf); it 
was implemented in the US with the rules by Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Office of Thrift 
Supervision, Treasury, Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework — Basel 
II. Final Rule, in 72 Federal Register 235, 69288 (December 7, 2007) (12 CFR Part 3, 12 CFR Parts 208 
and 225, 12 CFR Part 325, 12 CFR Parts 559, 560, 563, and 567); in the EU, with the so called Capital 
Requirements Directive: Package I, i.e. Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), 
OJ L 177 of 30.6.2006, p. 1 and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast), OJ L 177 of 
30.6.2006, p. 201; Package II, i.e. Commission Directive 2009/27/EC of 7 April 2009 amending certain 
Annexes to Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards technical 
provisions concerning risk management, Commission Directive 2009/83/EC of 27 July 2009 amending 
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unsatisfactory in Basel I. Without going into the details, the greatest problem with this 
new Accord is its complete reliance on the risk-assessments made by the credit rating 
agencies. The problem is that, as we shall see in § I.E, the market for credit rating is on 
its turn highly regulated, and this has led to a notorious oligopoly, which inevitably 
affects the quality of ratings. Again, in retrospect, entrusting credit rating agencies 
with such a great power appears to be another huge regulatory mistake, and fairly 
ironic as well if one considers how much their trustworthiness has come into question 
in the past few years54. 
 
I.D HOUSING MARKET POLICIES 
In the previous paragraph, we mentioned the severe distortions of the housing 
markets that arose from the policies adopted by several US authorities over the 
decades: before the 'recourse rule', there had been many other provisions "doping" 
this market, which, together with the cheap money policy by the Fed55, and with a 
                                                                                                                                               
certain Annexes to Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
technical provisions concerning risk management, and Directive 2009/111/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC 
as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory 
arrangements, and crisis management; and Package III, i.e. Directive 2010/76/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as 
regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of 
remuneration policies. 
54 See Juliusz Jabłecki, Mateusz Machaj, A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks' Leverage, 
in Friedman (ed.), What Caused the Financial Crisis?, pp. 200-227; also by Juliusz Jabłecki, The 
European Sovereign-Debt Crisis: A Failure of Regulation?, 24(1) Critical Review 1 (July 2012), 1-35; 
see also the analysis by Arnold Kling, The Unintended Consequences of International Bank Capital 
Standards, Mercatus Center (April 2009, Mercatus on Policy No. 44). 
55 On this link, see Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith, Montetary Policy, Credit Extension, and 
Housing Bubbles, 2008 and 1929, in Friedman (ed.), What Caused the Financial Crisis?, pp. 107-137. 
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century-long policy favouring home-ownership56, generated a combustible mixture57. 
As explained in a 1993 set of recommendations to the banks by the Boston Fed, "the 
Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling on the basis 
of race, color, religion, handicap, sex, familial status, or national origin. Under the Fair 
Housing Act, it is unlawful for any person who engages in the business of making or 
purchasing residential real estate loans, or in the selling, brokering, or appraising of 
residential real property, to discriminate on the basis of the factors listed above", 
while "[t]he Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) was enacted in 1974 to promote the 
availability of credit to all creditworthy applicants without regard to race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, receipt of public assistance funds, or 
the exercise of any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Regulation B, 
issued under the ECOA, prohibits creditor practices that discriminate on the basis of 
any of these factors"58. 
                                                 
56 This is due in particular to the mortgage interest deduction, introduced by the Revenue Act of 1913 
(ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, October 3, 1913). 
57 Salin, Revenir au capitalisme... pour éviter les crises, chapter 1, § 3; but see also Arnold Kling, 
Unchecked and Unbalanced: How the Discrepancy Between Knowledge and Power Caused the Financial 
Crisis and Threatens Democracy (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 2009), in particular pp. 1-10; and Peter 
J. Wallison, Housing Initiatives and Other Policy Factors, in Friedman (ed.), What Caused the Financial 
Crisis?, pp. 172-182. 
58 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Closing the Gap: A Guide to Equal Opportunity Lending (1993), 
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/closing-the-gap/closingt.pdf, p. 26. The FHA was Title VIII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (An act to prescribe penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation, 
and for other purposes), Pub.L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 81, April 11, 1968, 42 USC 3601 et seq.; the ECOA 
was Title V of An Act To increase deposit insurance from $20,000 to $40,000, to provide full insurance 
for public unit deposits of $100,000 per account, to establish a National Commission on Electronic Fund 
Transfers, and for other purposes, Pub.L. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521, October 28, 1974, 15 USC 1691 
et seq. 
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After that, the Community Reinvestment Act of 197759 established a scheme to 
favour access to home ownership by disadvantaged groups; s. 1211 of the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 198960 amended the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 197561 by adding a requirement that the banks made 
public the data on the ethnicity of those requiring and obtaining or not a mortgage 
from them; another 1992 statute62 imposed the government-sponsored businesses 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to stimulate universal access to home ownership63. 
Then the Federal Reserve of Boston in 1993 published the guidebook for banks 
mentioned slightly above64, where it recommended them, when dealing with 
someone requiring a mortgage, to disregard his income, the ratio between his salary 
and the mortgage required, and her credit record, in order not to discriminate against 
low-income people and minority members; and finally in 1995, penalties were even 
introduced for banks refusing to give credit to members of disadvantaged groups65; 
                                                 
59 Title VIII of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 [An Act To amend certain 
Federal laws pertaining to community development, housing, and related programs], Pub.L. 95-128, 91 
Stat. 1111, 1147, 12 USC § 2901 et seq., October 12, 1977. 
60 Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, August 9, 1989. 
61 Title III of An Act To extend the authority for the flexible regulation of interest rates on deposits and 
share accounts in depository institutions, to extend the National Commission on Electronic Fund 
Transfers, and to provide for home mortgage disclosure, Pub.L. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1124, 1125, 12 U.S.C. § 
2801 et seq., December 31, 1975. 
62 Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub.L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, October 28, 
1992. 
63 See on this issue David Stockman, The New Deal Origins of Fannie Mae and the Government-
Housing Complex, in Mises Daily, 28 May 2013. 
64 Above, note 57. 
65 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC); Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Office of Thrift Supervision, 
Treasury (OTS), Community Reinvestment Act Regulations. Final Rule, in 60 Federal Register 86, 22156 
(May 4, 1995) (12 CFR Part 25, 12 CFR Part 228, 12 CFR Part 345, 12 CFR Part 563e, 12 CFR Part 203) 
(in particular, it was provided that compliance by a bank with the Community Reinvestment Act would be 
taken into account when it was under review for operations of mergers, acquisitions, or opening of new 
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but the political pressure to "expand mortgage loans among low and moderate 
income people" kept growing66. 
It is well known how the housing bubble collapse in the US acted as a "detonator" 
of the global financial crisis, triggering the domino effect that has been threatening to 
bring the whole global economy to collapse67. At a closer look, such bubble has very 
clear regulatory causes, both at the federal and at the local level (in particular, local 
governments' strict regulations on land use and geographical land constraints 
prevented the supply to quickly adjust to an – artificially – increased demand68). 
 
I.E THE REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
In § I.C, we also hinted at the regulatory restrictions to the market for credit rating, 
that are at the origin of the current oligopoly. In particular, "since 1931, the 
government has required or encouraged certain types of investors to prefer financial 
instruments that rating agencies rate highly"69. 
But the most important barriers to entry were introduced in the US by the SEC with 
                                                                                                                                               
branches). 
66 As explained Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit To Aid Mortgage Lending, in The New 
York Times, 30 September 1999. 
67 A comprehensive account can be found in Oonagh McDonald, Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac: Turning 
the American Dream into a Nightmare (London-New York 2012). 
68 This point was made for instance by Randal O'Toole, How Urban Planners Caused the Housing 
Bubble, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 646, October 1, 2009; see also Mark A. Calabria, Local 
Governments Also To Blame For Housing Crisis, Cato@Liberty,  February 17, 2012, who refers to his 
own Supply: A Tale of Two Bubbles, Cato Journal, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Fall 2011), p. 551, to O'Toole's 
article, and – for some interesting evidence – to Haifang Huanga, Yao Tang, Residential land use 
regulation and the US housing price cycle between 2000 and 2009, 71(1) Journal of Urban Economics 93 
(January 2012). 
69 Claire A. Hill, Limits of Dodd-Frank's Rating Agency Reform, 15(1) Chapman Law Review 133, 139 
(2011); see also, by the same author, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 53 (2004). 
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some rules it enacted in 197570. Under these regulations, it became necessary to be 
specifically licensed in order to carry on this activity: indeed rating agencies became 
known as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. The licensing 
requirement, that was quite tough to meet for new-entrants, acted as a barrier to 
entry, and in the long run was responsible for the concentration of the market, 
consolidating the oligopoly of the existing companies in the US. On its turn, this 
concentration spilled over to Europe, where essentially no new entrant was able to 
challenge the leadership of the incumbents71. 
The distortions to this market had particularly relevant consequences, because, as 
we saw, the ratings issued by CRAs were on their turn central to the Basel II 
framework, making it necessary to undergo a review by them in order to be able to 
raise capital on the financial markets72. 
 
I.F DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES 
Another significant source of alteration of the free-market process is the existence 
of deposit insurance schemes in all the countries hit by the crisis. The US scheme is the 
                                                 
70 17 CFR 240.15c3-1. 
71 The lack of competition is arguably the main reason of the underperformance of credit rating agencies 
observed in recent years: on their "subprime debacle", see Lawrence J. White, The Credit-Rating 
Agencies and the Subprime Debacle, in Friedman (ed.), What Caused the Financial Crisis?, pp. 228-237; 
more generally, see also Siegfried Utzig, The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies: A European Banking Perspective (ADBI Working Paper Series No. 188, January 2010), 
available at http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.01.26.wp188.credit.rating.agencies.european.banking.pdf, pp. 
7-9. 
72 A detailed explanation of how the existing regulation of CRAs in the US contributed to the financial 
crisis, together with some suggested improvements, is offered by Emily McClintock Ekins, Mark A. 
Calabria, Regulation, Market Structure, and Role of the Credit Rating Agencies, Cato Policy Analysis No. 
704, 1 August 2012. 
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oldest, dating back to the Banking Act of 1933, that established the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation73, while a similar mandatory insurance of bank deposits was 
introduced in Europe only in the 1990s (previously, forms of voluntary schemes 
already existed in some countries74). In particular, Directive 94/19/CE of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee 
schemes75 established a duty for then EC Member States to introduce a deposit 
insurance scheme (for instance, Italy complied with such duty at the end of 199676, 
while the UK did it only in 200077). 
The problem with deposit insurance schemes is chiefly the great moral hazard they 
generate, creating the incentive for depositors to seek the highest returns from banks, 
without taking pain to evaluate how safe their money is with them, counting on the 
fact that they will not lose it, at least up to a certain threshold78. 
Ironically, deposit schemes would also be nothing more than illusion, at least 
according to Rothbard's version of them, that is very provocative but seems rather 
convincing: 
 
                                                 
73 The rules were then reformulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub.L. 81-797, 64 
Stat. 873, September 21, 1950. 
74 See Charles W. Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective, 50(2) J. Econ. 
History (1990) 283. 
75 Official Journal L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5. 
76 With Legislative Decree 4 December 1996, No 659, implementing Law 6 February 1996, No 52, Art. 
23. 
77 With the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 2000 c. 8. 
78 For an in-depth analysis (and critique) of deposit insurance, see chapter 6 (Should Government Play a 
Role in Banking?) of Lawrence H. White, The Theory of Monetary Institutions (Malden, Blackwell 1999), 
121-137. 
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[T]he FDIC itself has less than one percent of the huge number 
of deposits it “insures.” 
The very idea of “deposit insurance” is a swindle; how does 
one insure an institution (fractional reserve banking) that is 
inherently insolvent, and which will fall apart whenever the public 
finally understands the swindle? Suppose that, tomorrow, the 
American public suddenly became aware of the banking swindle, 
and went to the banks tomorrow morning, and, in unison, 
demanded cash. What would happen? The banks would be 
instantly insolvent, since they could only muster 10 percent of the 
cash they owe their befuddled customers. Neither would the 
enormous tax increase needed to bail everyone out be at all 
palatable. No: the only thing the Fed could do, and this would be 
in their power, would be to print enough money to pay off all the 
bank depositors. Unfortunately, in the present state of the 
banking system, the result would be an immediate plunge into 
the horrors of hyperinflation. 
Let us suppose that total insured bank deposits are $1,600 
billion. Technically, in the case of a run on the banks, the Fed 
could exercise emergency powers and print $1,600 billion in cash 
to give to the FDIC to pay off the bank depositors. The problem is 
that, emboldened at this massive bailout, the depositors would 
promptly redeposit the new $1,600 billion into the banks, 
increasing the total bank reserves by $1,600 billion, thus 
permitting an immediate expansion of the money supply by the 
banks by tenfold, increasing the total stock of bank money by $16 
trillion. Runaway inflation and total destruction of the currency 
would quickly follow.79 
 
                                                 
79 Rothbard, Fractional Reserve Banking: Part II. 
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I.G EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
As far as Europe and in particular the Eurozone are concerned, it is inevitable to 
focus also on the shortcomings of their institutional design: the mistakes made in 
drawing the underpinnings of such projects bear a great responsibility for the current 
dramatic situation. 
Such mistakes have been pointed out by many commentators, that have usually 
blamed the creation of a single currency without the simultaneous unification of the 
participating countries' economies and fiscal policies. However, as was explained by 
Pascal Salin in an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal, the problem was arguably not that 
one: in the US, when a State threatens to go bankrupt like Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy are threatening to do in Europe, other States are not supposed to bail it in, unlike 
it is happening de facto within the Eurozone, so there can actually be a single currency 
between countries whose economies and fiscal policies are not unitary80. 
Instead, the real problem seems to have been that the requirements that had to be 
met in order to be admitted to the Euro (the so called Maastricht criteria)81 were not 
taken seriously: also thanks to some creative accounting, Greece notoriously hid a 
substantial amount of its debt from its balance-sheet, by exploiting loopholes in 
Eurostat accounting rules, in order to falsely appear compliant with such 
                                                 
80 Pascal Salin, There Is No 'Euro Crisis', in The Wall Street Journal, 18 July 2012. See also former 
ECB executive board member Otmar Issing, Europe's political union is an idea worthy of satire, in 
Financial Times, 29 July 2012. 
81 The Maastricht criteria were contained in Article 121(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 140(1) of the 
 Revista da Associação Mineira de Direito e Economia 
 
210 
 
requirements, but when the scam was exposed, no punishment whatsoever was 
levied, and the ECB even refused to allow public access to the documents on the 
issue82). 
Similarly, after the EU Member States decided, with the Stability and Growth Pact, 
that such criteria should be met also once the euro was launched83, no penalty was 
ever imposed on countries that did not meet them84. In fact, the criteria were even 
relaxed in 200585, pursuant to the European Council held in Brussels on 22-23 
March86. 
Also such betrayal of the Maastricht spirit was arguably a regulatory failure: it is 
true that in this case some rules were in place, and we are advocating here in favour 
of their maintenance and respect, while they were blatantly unenforced. But there is 
no contradiction here because they were rules trying to make sure that Member 
States were fiscally responsible, and therefore to limit their spending. They were 
                                                                                                                                               
TFEU). 
82 Such denial has been challenged before the EU General Court, but the judges sided for the ECB 
(Thesing and Bloomberg Finance v. ECB, T-590/10); the appeal case is currently pending before the ECJ 
(C-28/13 P). 
83 The Stability and Growth Pact consisted of a Resolution of the European Council (Resolution of the 
European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact Amsterdam, 17 June 1997, OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1) 
and two Council Regulations (Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening 
of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 
L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1, and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6). 
84 The data is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/index_en.htm. 
85 Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on 
the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of 
economic policies, OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1, and Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure, OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5. 
86 The conclusions are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/2005-03-
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therefore good rules from the perspective here adopted, and it was very unwise to 
leave them unenforced. 
A similar argument can be made with regard to the absence, in the years leading to 
the crisis, of a constitutional rule prescribing a balanced budget in all the countries 
considered. This is another example of rule that, if in place and enforced, would have 
prevented public deficits to grow to such an unsustainable level as they did. 
 
I.H DEFICIT, DEBT, PUBLIC SPENDING AND TAXATION 
The very large deficits and public debts of the must troubled countries in Europe, 
but also of the US, are indeed another form of simply too much regulation (taking 
regulation – as explained in the introducing paragraph – as an equivalent to 
government intervention in the economy): after all, all forms of public spending derive 
from some legal provision authorizing them. Similarly, also the problem of the high 
levels of taxation, particularly serious especially in some countries such as Italy, but 
certainly present to some extent in all the countries most involved in the crisis (with 
the partial exception of Ireland), is yet another form of regulatory interference with 
the free-market process, that is severely impaired by a fiscal burden at the level 
reached both in Europe and in the US. 
 
I.I REGULATION IN ITS PROPER MEANING AND THE "TOO BIG TO FAIL" PROBLEM 
Finally, we cannot discount also the role played by the piles and piles of regulation 
                                                                                                                                               
23_council_presidency_conclusions_en.pdf. 
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– in its narrow sense – existing in all the countries under consideration. Contrary to 
popular belief, financial markets before the crisis were all but under-regulated: the 
amount of rules that existed before the crisis, and that tried to direct their ordinate 
development (either by setting some prudential standards, or by outright dictating the 
conduct of business to be followed), is astounding. It is impossible to go into details 
here, but suffice it to say that the underlying rationale of all these rules is arguably the 
aspiration to eliminate or at least reduce the systemic risk. However, from the analysis 
done in the previous paragraphs, it should have emerged that the deep sources of 
systemic risk lie in regulation itself. If one looks carefully, what conduct of business 
rules and prudential regulation try to do is to remedy the distortions created by other 
regulation. The problem is that, in so doing, they end up altering the free-market 
process even more. 
For instance, the existing rules setting the standards of conduct for credit rating 
agencies operators are arguably necessary only insofar as a government-created 
oligopoly exists in this market (see above, § I.E), and exactly the same is true with 
regard to the rules requiring government approval to operate as a bank87. 
Arguably, not only do all these rules fall short of guaranteeing an actual immunity 
from the risks they are trying to avert, but we could go as far as to claim that, without 
regulatory interference in the first place, the market would spontaneously adjust to 
                                                 
87 In the US, at the federal level such requirement was first introduced by ss. 5 ff. of the National Bank 
Act of 1864 (An Act to provide a National Currency, secured by a Pledge of United States Bonds, and to 
provide for the Circulation and Redemption thereof, 38th Congress, Sess. I, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, June 3, 
1864). 
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provide the outcome that such rules try to attain, by rewarding rating agencies issuing 
the most accurate reports and banks managing to be sound and safe, by ruling out any 
chance of banks to lend or invest more money that they actually hold, and by making 
consumers more careful on where they deposit their savings. Instead, we are 
confronted with rules carefully devised and continuously adjusted to remedy the 
consequences of other rules. 
However, such regulatory flood is not just redundant: it probably even contributes 
to worsen one of the problems it aims to solve, i.e. the "too big to fail" problem. This 
phrase famously refers to the existence of some financial institutions that are just so 
large that their default would make the whole system collapse, due to the great inter-
dependency of financial institutions from each other, something usually described as 
systemic risk. 
The reason why some financial institutions grow so big that their collapse would 
generate a domino effect and the fall of "faultless" institutions, is debatable. So far, 
we lack counter-evidence of what would happen in an unregulated system: 
presumably, the free market would automatically take care of limiting the size of 
financial institutions, avoiding their growth to such a level where no other market 
actor can rescue them. Therefore, the reason why "too big to fail" institutions exist is 
likely to be found in the informal promise by governments to bail such institutions in 
should they need it, a promise that sometimes is even proudly announced to the 
 Revista da Associação Mineira de Direito e Economia 
 
214 
 
public, as was the case with the infamous Greenspan Put88. 
Anyway, whatever be the source of the "too big to fail" problem, the whole body of 
financial regulation seems at least responsible for making it even worse. Indeed, by 
trying to remove the perspective of bankruptcy89, these rules alter substantially and 
definitively the functioning of the market process. Business risk is a fundamental 
component of a functioning market system, so trying to sterilize it already leads to 
creating a different one, that is no longer a genuine market system, but something 
else90: once again, blaming the financial turmoil on a lack of regulation looks like a 
very weak position. 
 
I.J A REGULATORY FAILURE 
The analysis in the previous paragraphs has tried to give an overview of how many 
examples of regulatory interference were in place in the American and European 
financial markets and economies in general. As was said, by far the most important 
form of interference is the one caused by the monopoly of central banks on issuing 
and determining the value of money. On its own, such power is able to create huge 
distortions in the market process, altering one of its fundamental elements. Prices are 
absolutely fundamental signals for market operators, that reflect the amount of 
                                                 
88 On which see for instance Marcus H. Miller, Paul A. Weller, Lei Zhang, Moral Hazard and the US 
Stock Market: The Idea of a 'Greenspan Put' (Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 
3041, 2001). 
89 The ninth edition (2013) of the Mises Seminar of the Bruno Leoni Institute was precisely devoted to 
the issue of Failure: Why We Need It. Some of the papers presented there are available at 
http://www.brunoleoni.it/sitonelsito.aspx?codice=0000002119&padre=0000002113. 
90 As a saying goes, "capitalism without bankruptcy is like religion without hell". 
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existing supply and demand for a certain good or service. 
Altering the price of money indirectly alters the prices of all goods and services, and 
a system where prices of goods and services are not freely determined by interactions 
between market operators, but are severely influenced by external factors, is a highly 
regulated system, and no longer a truly "free"-market system. 
The manipulation of money, already the source of economic cycles terminating in 
busts, becomes an even more serious problem when coupled with the other form of 
manipulation that we have briefly described, i.e. the fractional reserve banking, an 
inherently unstable system in that it is founded on the creation of money out of thin 
air. 
The situation becomes unsustainable because of the existence of the other rules 
and policies we have briefly reviewed: from the Basel Accords, creating an incentive 
for banks to invest in certain assets instead of others, thus artificially lowering the 
price of the former; to the measures implemented in the housing market, that – 
together with cheap money – artificially boost the value of real estate, until the 
bubble bursts and the whole economy is severely hit in a domino effect; from the 
regulatory barriers to entry in the markets for rating and for banking, that decrease 
competition and entrench oligopolies and incumbents' market shares, to deposit 
insurance schemes, that alter the risk perception of depositors; from the mistakes in 
the European institutional engineering, that allowed governments to be fiscally 
irresponsible without suffering any consequence, until the markets at some point took 
care of unveiling the illusion, to the excesses in taxation, public spending, and 
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accumulation of deficits and public debts, that in the current situation are threatening 
to take Euro countries' economies down, and finally to regulation in its narrow 
meaning, unwisely trying to make the failure of "too big to fail" institutions impossible, 
again altering the risk perception by market operators. 
On careful consideration, then, the crisis that the Western world has been 
experiencing in the past years looks all but a crisis from a deregulated market. Instead, 
it looks like a crisis from an over-regulated financial sector and economy in general, 
suffering from misguided incentives and inevitably falling into huge malinvestments, 
that on their turn must be liquidated at some point. Which is exactly what is 
happening. If this is true, then the ideal response to the crisis would be to correct the 
misaligned incentives created by excessive regulation, and let the market operate 
more freely, taking the principle of responsibility seriously and allowing competition to 
take care of protecting consumers and investors. Let us now move to contrast such 
ideal with the line of conduct followed by American and European legislators and 
regulators in the wake of the crisis. 
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II. POOR REGULATION IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS: PERSEVERARE 
DIABOLICUM 
 
 
xactly like in Part I, we are interested here in the big picture: the hundreds 
of pages of the Dodd-Frank Act91, for instance, are beyond the reach of this 
article. What we would like to inquire into is the underlying approach 
followed by governments in reaction to the crisis: have they realized that they had 
systematically interfered with the economy, severely damaging it, or have they 
claimed that more intervention from their part was needed to redress alleged market 
failures? The answer is invariably the latter. Let us try to provide an overview of the 
same areas analysed in Part I, looking at the main courses of action followed92. 
 
II.A CENTRAL BANKING 
If the manipulation of money is the issue that we have identified as the most 
important form of market alteration that accounts for the crisis, probably not by 
coincidence it is also the sector that shows the worst record also in the post-crisis 
years. 
All the central banks have responded to the crisis by lowering the interest rates to 
                                                 
91 An Act To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end "too big to fail", to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes, Pub.L. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, July 21, 2010. 
92 A comprehensive overview of the initial regulatory responses was done by harles A.E. Goodhart, The 
Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2010). 
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some historical lows, and getting closer to a zero interest-rate policy. The Federal 
Reserve soon reacted to the crisis by cutting the benchmark interest rate, gradually 
slashing it from a 5.25% in September 2007 to a 0.25% in December 2008: since then, 
the rates have lingered in a region between zero and 0.25%93. 
Similarly, the ECB progressively cut its benchmark rate from a 4.25% in September 
2008 to a 1% in June 2009, to raise it again to 1.25% in April 2011 and up to 1.5% 
between July and October 2011, only to slash it again to 1.25% and then to 1% that 
same month, and then to 0.75% in July 2012, to 0.5% in May 2013, and finally to 
0.25% in November 2013, a record low94 (according to the ECB Governor Mario Draghi, a raise is unlikely for 
quite some time95). 
But intervention by central banks definitely did not remain confined to making 
money cheaper by setting the benchmark interest rates: they notoriously resorted to 
several other measures, including "unconventional" or non-standard measures. In 
particular, as far as our field of analysis is concerned, both the Fed and the ECB took a 
highly interventionist stance96. 
As for the Fed, it engaged in a massive purchase of securities, principally with the 
goal of providing markets with new liquidity, that was newly-printed for the specific 
purpose of carrying on the purchases: such programme was characterized by the Fed 
                                                 
93 The data is available for instance at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/interest-rate. 
94 The data is available for instance at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/interest-rate. 
95 Brian Blackstone, Draghi Says ECB Won't Raise Rates for Foreseeable Future, in The Wall Street 
Journal online (1 August 2013). 
96 A detailed chronological account is available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf and at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/IRCTimelinePublic.pdf. 
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Governor Ben Bernanke as "credit easing". 
But the most important measure was the quantitative easings, consisting in – so far 
– three rounds of purchases of securities (mostly US government bonds, or Treasuries, 
and mortgage-backed securities) with newly-electronically-created money, with the 
aim to boost the price and reduce the yields of the assets bought, and most of all 
increase the money supply, in an effort to stimulate the economy97 (the QEs started 
respectively in November 2008, November 2010 and September 2012 in the US98). 
The ECB statute prevented it from engaging in the same operation, because it 
would have amounted to a direct financing of Member States' public debts, but this is 
forbidden by Art. 123(1) TFEU (as well as by Art. 21(1) of Protocol No. 4), that 
stipulates: "Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European 
Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States [...] in favour of Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other 
public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of 
Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the 
European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments". 
However, between December 2011 and February 2012 the ECB notoriously devised 
two exceptionally long-term refinancing operations for banks (LTROs), which consisted 
                                                 
97 For a critique of Fed's actions from a moral point of view, see George Bragues, The Ethics of U.S. 
Monetary Policy in Response to the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, Libertarian Papers 1, 31 (2009), 
available at http://libertarianpapers.org/. 
98 The third round of QE, of an open-ended nature, has consisted in a purchase of $85bn assets per 
month since December 2012, and so far this pace has not slowed down, let alone stopped, in spite of the 
announcement of the so called tapering by Ben Bernanke, so far not implemented (in fact, chairman 
Bernanke clarified in July 2013 that the Fed still considered an easy monetary policy necessary for the 
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in a loan of a virtually unlimited amount of cash to banks99, at a 1% interest-rate, for 
36 months (on top of other refinancing operations with shorter maturities, renewed at 
least until mid-2014). Banks had to offer collateral in order to obtain the money, but 
the ECB increased collateral availability100, and Italian banks were even helped by an 
emergency measure passed by the Italian government, providing special public 
guarantee of bank bonds, so that they could qualify as safe enough collateral101. 
But there were other non-standard measures implemented by the Fed and the 
ECB102. Fed's interventions began with the establishment of the Term Auction Facility 
and of swap lines with other central banks103 in December 2007, in a coordinated 
attempt to lower the spread between overnight and longer-term interbank loans, that 
was signalling a decrease in interbank lending confidence104. A few months later, the 
Fed introduced the Term Securities Lending Facility and the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility to inject liquidity into the markets, and increased the swap lines with other 
central banks. 
But such actions were not enough, and were followed by several similar ones, all 
aimed at relaxing the rules on collateral against which it would loan money. Later in 
                                                                                                                                               
foreseeable future). 
99 Which ended up being of more than 1bn euro. 
100 For the details, see the press release of 8 December announcing the operation, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html. 
101 Article 8 (Misure per la stabilità del sistema creditizio [Measures for the stability of the credit 
system]) of Decree-Law 6 December 2011, No. 201, converted into Law 22 December 2011, No. 214. 
102 For an overall critique of the former, see Lawrence H. White, The Rule of Law or the Rule of 
Central Bankers?, in 30(3) Cato Journal 451 (2010). 
103 Including the ECB: see its press release of 12 December 2007, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2007/html/pr071212.en.html. 
104 After several temporary renewals, this measure was renewed for an indefinite time in October 
2013: see Claire Jones, Central banks agree to retain swap lines, in Financial Times, 31 October 2013. 
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2008, rules on collateral eligible in both TSLF and PDCF operations were relaxed, and 
the swap lines further increased. In September 2008, another instrument to fight 
markets' illiquidity was engineered, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, and swap lines with the ECB and other central 
banks were further increased. Only a few weeks later, yet another instrument was 
established, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (to include commercial paper in 
the collateral), and after another couple of weeks a new one, the Money MaIt ended 
uprket Investor Funding Facility; November 2008 then witnessed the creation of a 
further one, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. 
These facilities, that were intended to last for the short time necessary to put 
markets back on track, were extended for a longer duration than originally provided 
(they were eventually closed starting from February 2010, after some stability was 
restored to the markets), and the rules on collateral were further expanded several 
times, in an unprecedented effort to provide liquidity to the markets. 
In April 2009, the Fed also struck foreign currency swap agreements with the ECB, the 
BoE, the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Japan, a move that was severely 
criticized as a covered bailout of the Eurozone105. This facility was later extended on 
its turn. 
Finally, the Fed in September 2011 also engaged in another significant move, the so 
called Operation Twist, that it presented in the following way: "Under the maturity 
                                                 
105 Philipp Bagus, The Fed's Swap Bailout of the Eurozone, April 10, 2012, Mises Daily, 10 April 
2012. 
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extension program, the Federal Reserve intends to sell or redeem a total of $667 
billion of shorter-term Treasury securities by the end of 2012 and use the proceeds to 
buy longer-term Treasury securities. This will extend the average maturity of the 
securities in the Federal Reserve’s portfolio. By reducing the supply of longer-term 
Treasury securities in the market, this action should put downward pressure on 
longer-term interest rates, including rates on financial assets that investors consider to 
be close substitutes for longer-term Treasury securities. The reduction in longer-term 
interest rates, in turn, will contribute to a broad easing in financial market conditions 
that will provide additional stimulus to support the economic recovery"106. 
Let us now move on to consider the unconventional measures taken by the ECB, in 
an effort to provide liquidity to a banking sector under severe stress: besides making 
available a great amount of liquidity in foreign currencies107, the ECB engaged in the 
outright purchase of securities. This happened with the Covered Bond Purchase 
Programmes108 and with the Securities Markets Programme109. While in the latter 
scheme bond purchases were sterilized (i.e. the liquidity injected into the system was 
reabsorbed through other operations by the ECB), this was not done with the CBPPs, 
                                                 
106 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/maturityextensionprogram.htm; moreover, "[i]n 
June 2012, the FOMC continued the program through the end of 2012, which will result in the purchase, 
as well as the sale and redemption, of an additional $267 billion in Treasury securities": see 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/maturityextensionprogram-faqs.htm. 
107 On which see below. 
108 Implemented respectively with Decision of the European Central Bank of 2 July 2009 on the 
implementation of the covered bond purchase programme (ECB/2009/16), OJ EU 4.7.2009, L 175/18, 
and Decision of the European Central Bank of 3 November 2011 on the implementation of the second 
covered bond purchase programme (ECB/2011/17), OJ EU 16.11.2011, L 297/70. 
109 Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 establishing a securities markets 
programme (ECB/2010/5), OJ EU 20.5.2010, L 124/8. 
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which therefore substantially increased the money base in the Eurozone110. Moreover, 
by way of all these purchases, the ECB expanded its balance sheet to a higher level 
than the Fed's ($3.2 trillion against $2.9 trillion at the end of 2011111, although it later 
decreased substantially), and it also reached an unprecedented level of leverage, with 
a reported ratio between total assets held and capital and reserves exceeding 30 
times112. 
But the most impressive move by the ECB was the launch of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions programme, that replaced the SMP. The OMT scheme was anticipated by 
a famous speech in London in July 2012 by ECB Governor Mario Draghi, where he 
announced that ECB was ready to do “whatever it takes” to save the Euro; the official 
announcement came in August 2012, and the details were outlined in a press release 
of September 2012113, but no official act was ever adopted to support it, and in fact 
some crucial aspects remained obscure and Mr Draghi had to larify them. 
The OMT consists in the conditional purchase, in the secondary markets, of Euro-
area government bonds (without limits, as clarified by Mr Draghi); it has never been 
actually employed so far, but its announcement was decisive in putting an end (at 
least temporarily) to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis started in the summer of 
2011. A constitutional challenge was brought against the OMT scheme before the 
                                                 
110 As emerges from the Liquidity analysis by the ECB itself on its website, at 
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html; see also the summary of ECB open market operations at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html. 
111 See Tyler Durden, ECB's Balance Sheet Now Far Bigger Than Fed's, More Levered Than 
Lehman, PIIGS Exposure Up 50% In 6 Months, in Zerohedge, 20 December 2011. 
112 Jamie Coleman, Bloomberg: ECB Leveraged Like Lehman, in Forexlive, 20 December 2011. 
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German Constitutional Court and it has attracted a vast attention114, but the 
consensus is that the German judges are very unlikely to take a strong stand against 
the programme: even though it would only affect Germany, a negative 
pronouncement would indirectly jeopardise the entire scheme, a step the German 
court will most likely want to avoid. 
Another non-conventional measure was the widening of the collaterals accepted in 
credit operations by banks, in a parallel move to the one implemented by the Fed with 
its several facilities described above. This is another important aspect of money 
manipulation: the wider is the amount of securities that banks can pledge in return for 
cash, the easier it is for them to obtain such cash, the more cash is injected into the 
economy. 
Art. 18.1 of the ECB Statute stipulates that «In order to achieve the objectives of 
the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, the ECB and the national central banks may: [...] — 
conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants, with 
lending being based on adequate collateral»115. It is therefore up to the ECB itself to 
decide what qualifies as adequate collateral. The ECB did that with its Guideline on 
monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem, originally adopted in 
2000116, subsequently amended several times, and finally recast in 2011117. 
                                                                                                                                               
113 ECB Press Release, Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, 6 September 2012. 
114 A summary of the legal issues involved is the case is for instance the one by Helmut Siekmann, 
Volker Wieland, The European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions and the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (Working Paper Series 
No. 71 (2013)). 
115 Emphasis added. 
116 ECB/2000/7, OJ EC 11.12.2000 L 310/1. 
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Coherently with its overarching policy, the ECB acted repeatedly to loosen the 
eligibility criteria for collateral in response to the crisis: admittedly, from time to time 
some restrictions were also introduced, but the overall trend has definitely been 
towards relaxing the standards for collaterals118. 
Moreover, the Guidelines rely on certain External Credit Assessment Institutions 
(ECAIs) for credit risk assessment, which are the usual incumbent rating firms, whose 
oligopoly is then inevitably reinforced once more. 
Finally, the ECB reportedly saved Greece from bankruptcy at least once by increasing 
the upper limit for Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA, a line of credit that national 
central banks can provide to their banks suffering a crisis of liquidity)119: this was 
necessary for the Greek National Bank to be able to loan to Greek banks the €3 billion 
cash needed to repay a maturing bond of the Greek government120. Similarly, it 
reportedly overlooked the practice by the Bank of France (and possibly other national 
central banks), under the Short Term European Paper programme, of accepting 
collateral of poor value in exchange for cash, in order to help national banks in 
distress, which in turn keep buying French sovereign debt121. The legitimacy of such 
coordinated actions by the ECB and the national central banks seems really 
                                                                                                                                               
117 ECB/2011/14, OJ EU 14.12.2011 L 331/1. 
118 See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/coll/html/index.en.html. 
119 Jan Hildebrand, Sebastian Jost, EZB verschafft Griechen Luft [ECB gives Greece a breather], in 
Die Welt, 4 August 2012. The details on the functioning of the ELA, that was used also for Ireland and 
Cyprus, were made public by the ECB in October 2013: see their ELA procedures on its website. 
120 Maria Marquart, The European Central Bank's Discreet Help for Greece, in Spiegel Online, 8 
August 2012. 
121 See M. Brendel, S. Jost, Die europäische Notenpresse 
gerät außer Kontrolle [The European money-printing press out of control], in Die Welt, 6 January 2013. 
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questionable in light of the prohibition to finance Member States' debt clearly set out 
in the Treaties. 
In fact, if the Fed, in order to pursue its very activist policies, could rely on its 
emergency powers under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, things are more 
complicated as regards the ECB, that has no equivalent emergency powers and whose 
mandate limits (or should limit) its ability to rein in distressed markets. For that 
matter, an action such as the one just described, implemented in order to rescue 
Greece from imminent bankruptcy, is almost certainly in breach of the Treaties; again, 
though, no remedy seems to be available, also considering that the German 
Constitutional Court rejected the request for a preliminary injunction in a proceeding 
challenging the legality of the ESM, and is very unlikely to reverse its stance on the 
merits (see below, § II.G). 
Similarly, no remedy, even in theory, is available against the decisions of the central 
banks on monetary policies, and not even to have them at least comply with their 
inflation target, in case they miss it. Even worse, in the US it is the monetary system 
itself that is arguably incompatible with the original constitutional design122, but no 
remedy seems actually available either. 
 
II.B FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING 
Unfortunately, fractional reserve banking was all but called into question by 
                                                 
122 See the analysis by Richard H. Timberlake Jr, From Constitutional to Fiat Money: The U.S. 
Experience, in 32(2) Cato Journal 349 (2012). 
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mainstream economic thought and subsequently by policy reform proposals. As was 
mentioned, the legitimacy of this practice is debated even among Austrian scholars, 
and the controversy was revamped in the wake of the crisis. However, such debate did 
not cross the borders of intra-Austrian discussions, and in fact both the Fed (with a 
decision effective 29 December 2011)123 and the ECB (starting from 18 January 
2012)124 went as far as lowering the reserve requirements imposed on deposit 
institutions as a response to the crisis, in this way further increasing the power of 
banks to create money "out of thin air". 
 
II.C BASEL III 
Contrary to its proponents' expectations, also the Basel II Accord fell short of 
providing the desired stability to the global financial markets. In fact, as we saw, it 
arguably contributed to the severe imbalances that eventually ended up in the 
markets collapse. 
However, global financial regulators opined that the problem did not lie in the very 
fact that financial institutions leverage their capital, investing many times more assets 
than they actually hold, counting on the fact that they will be bailed out in case 
something goes wrong. Instead, they thought the problem was again – as with Basel I 
– only with the details of the Accord, and kept trusting their ability to definitively 
                                                 
123 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm. 
124 As can be derived from the Instruments section on ECB website, at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/mr/html/calc.en.html: in particular, the reserve ratio for "all 
other liabilities", not included in the list of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2818/98 of the European 
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remedy the previous shortcomings by simply adjusting such details. 
This fine-tuning effort was done with the new round of Basel Accords, the so called 
Basel III125. This new set of rules tries to make financial institutions more resilient and 
improve risk management. Without going into the details, suffice it to say that the 
changes are mainly related to leverage ratios and capital requirements: while, in the 
wake of the crisis, financial regulators had relaxed capital definitions in order to help 
banks face an emergency situation126, it became clear that in the long run such rules 
had instead to be tightened, in order to make banks stronger and better prepared to 
face shocks and systemic contagion. Unfortunately, Basel III rules are currently set to 
be fully implemented only in 2019, and came out less stringent than originally 
anticipated127. 
But even though Basel III is a step towards a sounder financial system, the changes 
brought about remain anyway anchored to the paradigm followed by Basel I and Basel 
II: some shocks may be averted by the new rules, but the rationale behind them is the 
same as the one behind the rules in Basel I and Basel II that proved spectacularly 
                                                                                                                                               
Central Bank of 1 December 1998 on the application of minimum reserves, was cut down to 1% from the 
previous 2%. 
125 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems (December 2010, rev June 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf; the implementation process is still ongoing, both in the US (the 
latest proposed rulemaking is available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2012/2012-06-12_notice_dis-
b.pdf), and in the EU, where the Commission on 20 July 2011 adopted a proposal for a CRD IV package, 
that would replace the current directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 with a regulation and a directive (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/new_proposals_en.htm). 
126 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Capital Adequacy Guidelines: Treatment of 
Perpetual Preferred Stock Issued to the United States Treasury Under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, 73 Federal Register 205, 62851, October 22, 2008 (12 CFR Part 225). 
127 Brooke Masters, Banks win more flexible Basel rules, in Financial Times, 6 January 2013. 
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inadequate to prevent the crisis128. 
In particular, government bonds rated AA- or higher keep being considered risk 
free, with the consequence that there is still a great (distorted) incentive to purchase 
them, because no capital needs to be set aside against these bonds129: by contrast, 
corporate bonds with the same rating require a 20 per cent risk weighting (the 
unequal treatment is the same with bonds rated A+ to A-, that require a 20 per cent 
risk weighting for sovereign bonds and a 50 per cent one for corporate bonds; for 
bonds rated BBB+ to BBB-, that require a 50 per cent risk weighting in case of 
sovereign bonds and a 100 per cent in case of corporate ones; and for bonds rated B+ 
to B-, that require a 100 per cent risk weighting if it is sovereign bonds, while a 150 per 
                                                 
128 Similar reasons for scepticism were raised by the Free Exchange blog of The Economist, in a 
rather convincing post of 13 September 2010, Third time's the charm?, where the author observed, quite 
presciently: "More important, the new regulatory scheme could fail in several ways. The most serious 
failure in Basel III is that it doesn't address the principal contribution of Basel II to the last financial crisis, 
namely, the calculation of risk-weights. One of the key components of Basel II was to increase the amount 
of capital banks had to hold against riskier assets. Extremely low-risk assets, meanwhile, could be held 
with very little or even no capital. Risk, moreover, was calculated primarily by reference to the rating 
assigned by one of the recognised ratings agencies. The consequence of this Basel II reform was to 
discourage banks from lending to risky enterprises, and to encourage the accumulation of apparently risk-
free assets. This was a primary contributor to the structured finance craze, as securitisation was a way to 
"manufacture" apparently risk-free assets out of risky pools. What brought banks like Citigroup and Bank 
of America to their knees wasn't direct exposure to sub-prime loans, but exposure to triple-A-rated debt 
backed by pools of such loans, debt which turned out not to be risk-free at all. Since it did not change this 
risk-weighting, Basel III effectively doubles down on Basel II. Banks will need to hold more common 
equity than ever—against their risk-weighted assets. That massively increases the incentive to find low-
risk-weight assets with some return, since these assets can be leveraged much more highly than risky 
assets. Unless I've missed something, lending to AA-rated sovereigns still carries a risk-weight of zero. So 
one result of Basel III could be to encourage banks to increase their lending to sovereigns at the margins 
of zero-risk-weight status. If that happens, anyone want to guess where the next crisis will crop up?". 
129 This adds to another regulatory preferential treatment for government bonds, consisting in the fact 
that “While bank exposures to a single counterparty are limited, in principle, to a quarter of their eligible 
capital, exposures to sovereigns are exempted from that large exposures regime”, as explained by 
Deutsche Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, Stop encouraging banks to buy government debt, in 
Financial Times, 30 September 2013. Not surprisingly, bank exposure to government bonds in the EU has 
been further increasing, as reported by Christopher Thompson, Patrick Jenkins, Bank exposure to EU 
states’ bonds on rise, in Financial Times, 13 October 2013. 
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cent one if it is corporate bonds130). 
The only positive innovation from our perspective was a joint memorandum by the 
Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the Department of the Treasury 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation131 proposing a regulatory turnaround: 
changing the current risk weight applied to gold bullion (that now has a 50 per cent 
risk weighting), and applying a zero risk weight. If this change were implemented, it 
would be a historical acknowledgement of the fact that gold is money, something that 
has been denied ever since President Nixon discontinued the pegging of dollar to 
gold132; however, as was easily predictable, such proposal was never followed-up. 
 
II.D HOUSING MARKET POLICIES 
As is well known, in the US the housing market sector was the first and most 
severely hit by the crisis, the one that experienced the worst bubble. We will now 
focus on the regulatory responses by American legislators and regulators in this 
sector. It is a highly instructive analysis, because it allows us to observe the typical 
approach followed by US authorities to fight the crisis, the one that we have been 
criticizing over the course of this article and that EU authorities have predominantly 
followed as well. Again, a full analysis would require a self-standing work, so we will be 
                                                 
130 See this chart: http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2011/12/9/saupload_Basle-
II_2Brisk_2Bweights_2Bby_2Bratings.png. 
131 Department of the Treasury (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-Based 
Capital Rule; Market Risk Capital Rule, available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2012/2012-06-
12_notice_dis-c.pdf, pp. 128 and 290. 
132 Alasdair Macleod, Gold reentering the monetary system, Cobden Centre, 2 July 2012. 
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content with sketching the big picture, avoiding the technicalities. 
The first actions were a coordinated plan by the Treasury and the Fed to tackle the 
demise of the housing values and the severe stress on government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The business of these two 
enterprises was to back home mortgages; they were formally privately-owned, but in 
fact they received substantial sponsorship from the federal government. When the 
subprime home mortgages burst, Fannie and Freddie were severely hit, so 
intervention was focused primarily on them. 
On July 13, 2008, the Fed announced it had "granted the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York the authority to lend to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should such lending 
prove necessary. Any lending would be at the primary credit rate and collateralized by 
U.S. government and federal agency securities. This authorization is intended to 
supplement the Treasury's existing lending authority and to help ensure the ability of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to promote the availability of home mortgage credit 
during a period of stress in financial markets"133. 
On the same day, the Secretary of the Treasury announced a three-pronged plan of 
his own: "First, as a liquidity backstop, the plan includes a temporary increase in the 
line of credit the GSEs have with Treasury. Treasury would determine the terms and 
conditions for accessing the line of credit and the amount to be drawn. Second, to 
ensure the GSEs have access to sufficient capital to continue to serve their mission, 
                                                 
133 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press release of 13 July 2008, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080713a.htm. 
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the plan includes temporary authority for Treasury to purchase equity in either of the 
two GSEs if needed. Use of either the line of credit or the equity investment would 
carry terms and conditions necessary to protect the taxpayer. Third, to protect the 
financial system from systemic risk going forward, the plan strengthens the GSE 
regulatory reform legislation currently moving through Congress by giving the Federal 
Reserve a consultative role in the new GSE regulator's process for setting capital 
requirements and other prudential standards"134. 
But the main form of intervention came a few days later, on 26 July 2008, when the 
Congress, with bipartisan support, passed the 694-page Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), signed into law by President Bush on 30 July 2008135. 
This comprehensive piece of legislation consisted of several different acts, each of 
them tackling a different aspect. The most important provisions were the following: a 
new tax credit for home purchases; an offer of emergency help to local governments 
to buy and renovate abandoned and foreclosed homes; an increase (up to $300 
billion) in the limit for the refinance mortgages that the Federal Housing 
Administration was authorized to insure in order to avoid potential foreclosures; an 
increase in the dollar limit of the loans that the GSEs are allowed to purchase; an 
authorization to states to refinance subprime loans; the merger of the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and of the Federal Housing Finance Board into a 
newly-established regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), with the 
                                                 
134 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Paulson Announces GSE Initiatives, 13 July 2008, available at 
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power to oversee GSEs and Federal Home Loan Banks; an enhancement of the 
mortgage disclosure requirements; a new mandatory licensing and registration system 
for mortgage loan originators; and finally, the authorization to the Treasury to 
refinance Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and purchase agency-guaranteed mortgage-
backed securities, coupled with the increase of the Treasury's debt ceiling by $800 
billion. 
Relying on the provisions of the HERA, on 7 September 2008 the FHFA announced it 
had put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under its conservatorship136. On its turn, this 
lied the basis for an agreement of both GSEs with the Treasury, under which the 
Treasury committed to invest up to 100 billion dollars in each of them, in return for a 
certain amount of senior preferred capital137. Between October and 2008 and 
December 2009, the Treasury also enacted its agency MBS purchase program138. 
The Fed followed suit: on 25 November 2008, it announced the creation of the 
already mentioned TALF139 and the intention to purchase up to $100 billion of "the 
direct obligations of housing-related government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-Fannie 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1079.aspx. 
135 Pub.L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, July 30, 2008. 
136 Federal Housing Finance Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart (7 September 
2008), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23/FHFAStatement9708final.pdf. It is interesting to 
retrace the fateful history of Fannie: see James R. Hagerty, The Fateful History of Fannie Mae. New Deal 
Birth to Mortgage Crisis Fall (The History Press, Charleston 2012); see also David Stockman, The New 
Deal Origins of Fannie Mae and the Government-Housing Complex (Mises Daily, 28 May 2013). 
137 The agreements and the subsequent amendments are available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=364. 
138 The details are available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Pages/mbs-
purchase-program.aspx. 
139 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press release of 25 November 2008, available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm. 
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Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks-and mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae"140. 
Such actions substantially amounted to a bailout of Fannie and Freddie out of 
taxpayers' money, and eventually were not even included in the federal budget141. 
They managed to partially stabilize the housing market (socializing the cost of the de 
facto bailout), but in the medium run they did not prove particularly effective in 
ending the easy credit to subprime borrowers: a New York Times reportage of April 
2012 already showed that there were signs that subprime mortgages were 
resuming142. This is quite disappointing, if one looks at the cost so far of the 
nationalization of Fannie and Freddie: according to the Office of Management and 
Budget, "Treasury currently has a net investment of $151b in Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac [...]. OMB projects the eventual cost to fall to $28b by fiscal year 2022"143. 
And nonetheless, as admits the same Office of Management and Budget report, 
"the housing market remains a challenge"144: moreover, a plan by the Obama 
administration to reduce "principal on mortgages worth more than the underlying 
                                                 
140 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press release of 25 November 2008, available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125b.htm. 
141 Brian Faler, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac to Be Kept Off Budget, White House Says, in Bloomberg, 
12 September 2008. 
142 Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Tara Siegel Bernard, Lenders Again Dealing Credit to Risky Clients, in 
New York Times, 11 April 2012, p. A1. 
143 Department of the Treasury, The Financial Crisis Response In Charts (April 2012), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/Documents/20120413_FinancialCrisisResponse.pdf. 
144 See also this column in the Financial Times of 27 February 2012 by Robert Reich, Housing is the 
rotting core of the US recovery. According to Mark A. Calabria, some role in slowing the recovery might 
also be played by the rules governing the foreclosure procedure: in particular, judicial foreclosures might 
be slower and therefore worse than simply administrative ones: see his Cato@Liberty post of March 8, 
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home"145 was blocked by the FHFA (on the grounds that it might determine further 
costs for the taxpayers and create a perverse incentive for borrowers currently paying 
off their debts to stop doing that in order to take advantage of the plan), leaving the 
administration with not many other policy options to keep artificially sustaining the 
troubled housing market146. Unfortunately from our perspective, the only "healthy" 
choice, i.e. simply letting malinvestments to be liquidated, as painful as that may be, is 
not even taken into consideration; nor have unwise policy choices such as the interest 
mortgage deduction been discontinued yet; in fact, the Obama administration seems 
to be trying all they can to keep alimenting the bubble147, and it is hardly surprising 
that this approach is not proving particularly satisfactory. 
To conclude, "the Treasury [...] amended its agreements with Fannie and Freddie so 
that the companies no longer have to pay a fixed dividend to the U.S. taxpayer, but 
                                                                                                                                               
2012, Are Courts Dragging out the Housing Crisis?. 
145 Robin Harding, Regulator blocks US mortgage relief plan, in Financial Times, 31 July 2012. 
146 After such decision by the FHFA, a US Senator, Jeff Merley, came up with a plan for a mass 
mortgage refinancing, at the expense of a government-financed trust: this plan was praised by Joseph E. 
Stiglitz and Mark Zandi in a New York Times op-ed, The One Housing Solution Left: Mass Mortgage 
Refinancing, 13 August 2012, p. A17, and criticized by Mark A. Calabria in a post on the same day in 
Cato@Liberty, Ricardo and Mass Mortgage Refinancing. 
147 This applies also to the $25 billion foreclosure-abuse settlement negotiated between the US 
government, 49 state Attorney Generals, and five major American banks (it was announced on 9 February 
2012: see 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2012/SettlementFeb92
012), that was part of the overall policy of helping distressed borrowers, but at the expense of other 
taxpayers, as explained by Shahien Nasiripour in two pieces published on the Financial Times website on 
16 February 2012, US taxpayers lose over banks deal, and US taxpayers to subsidise $40bn housing 
settlement; see also the report by Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama administration pushes banks to make 
home loans to people with weaker credit, in The Washington Post, 3 April 2013. To be sure, there are 
worrying signs of a regrowing bubble: see Ruth Mantell, U.S. home-price growth fastest in nearly 7 years, 
in MarketWatch, 28 May 2013, and Home-price growth slightly moderates in June, in MarketWatch, 27 
August 2013. 
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instead “every dollar of profit” from the companies to the taxpayer"148. In spite of the 
misguiding announcement by the Treasury149, "[t]he problem is that the Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) have never had a year where their profits would have 
covered the dividend payments, so while we can debate if the taxpayer will recover 
anything from the GSEs, shifting to just collecting profits definitely means the 
taxpayer’s potential recoupment is lower"150. 
 
II.E THE REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
Credit rating agencies came under harsh criticism and regulatory scrutiny due to 
their quite remarkable shortcomings in timely and accurately registering the credit 
risks of both companies and sovereign states. As we saw, in this field as in all the other 
ones we have considered, there was all but a lack of regulation in place before the 
crisis, and in fact the government-entrenched oligopoly and the barriers to entry 
existing in the US are arguably responsible for the unsatisfactory outcomes. With the 
outbreak of European sovereign bond crisis, many European leaders reacted furiously 
against the multiple downgrades inflicted to their countries by CRAs, in their view 
unjustified. In Italy, some prosecutors even alleged that some top managers of S&P 
                                                 
148 Mark A. Calabria, Geithner Favors Fannie Mae Debtholders over Taxpayers … Again, in 
Cato@Liberty, 17 August 2012. 
149 Department of the Treasury, Treasury Department Announces Further Steps to Expedite Wind 
Down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 17 August 2012. 
150 Mark A. Calabria, Geithner Favors Fannie Mae Debtholders over Taxpayers … Again. Explains 
the author: "How does the change protect debtholders over taxpayers? It reduces the ability of FHFA to 
place Fannie or Freddie into a receivership, under which FHFA could impose losses on creditors. Under 
Section 1145 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act [http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
110publ289/pdf/PLAW-110publ289.pdf], FHFA has the discretion of appointing a receiver if one the 
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conspired with the purpose of destabilizing the Italian government, and downgraded 
on purpose Italian bonds contrary to the much better data on the credit-worthiness of 
the Italian government that would have been available to them151 – a truly far-fetched 
accusation. Other litigation was brought against CRAs in several other countries, 
including in the US (see in particular the fraud lawsuit brought by the US government 
against Standard & Poor's, that the latter publicly accused of being a form of 
retaliation for downgrading the US government debt a few days earlier)152. 
Anyway CRAs were subject to some new regulations by the Dodd-Frank Act (see 
below, § II.I), essentially in an effort to correct the misguided over-reliance on CRAs 
typical of the existing regulation. 
As for Europe, CRAs were subject to a particularly intense new round of legislation, 
and initiatives were taken there to regulate such market even more than it had 
already been, rather than trying to remove barriers to entry and encourage 
competition153. Some far-reaching changes, like the implementation of a public 
European CRA, have so far been turned down154, but other important innovations 
                                                                                                                                               
GSEs displays an “inability to meet obligations,” which would include dividend payments. By essentially 
taking away that lever from FHFA, Treasury has greatly reduced any chance of a receivership". 
151 Italy prosecutors wind up S&P market abuse probe: source, in Reuters, 31 May 2012; also 
Moody's and Fitch are being probed by the same magistrates, and so far a criminal case has been sought 
by them also against two of the latter's top managers: Ambrose Evans-Pritchard Fitch is targeted by 
Italian magistrate, in The Telegraph, 23 August 2012. 
152 Mark A. Calabria, in his Cato Policy Analysis written together with Emily McClintock Ekins (see 
above, note 71), and in a more recent blog post, convincingly argues that Liability Is 'Wrong' Solution for 
Rating Agencies, Cato@Liberty, 13 November 2012. 
153 The same approach can be said to characterize the reforms brought about by the Dodd-Frank Act 
in the US: for an analysis of the shortcomings of these reforms, even though from a different perspective, 
see Hill, Limits of Dodd-Frank's Rating Agency Reform. 
154 Other rules, limiting inter alia the ability of CRAs to issue unsolicited sovereign debt ratings, were 
approved by the European Parliament on first reading on 16 January 2013. 
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were brought about by Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009155, subsequently amended by 
Regulation (EU) No 513/2011156 and Regulation (EU) No 462/2013157, and 
implemented by Commission Delegated Regulations (EU) Nos 272158, 446159, 447160, 
448161, 449162 and 946/2012163. 
It is beyond our reach to consider such new rules in detail164: suffice it to say that, 
                                                 
155 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit rating 
agencies. 
156 Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. 
157 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. On its turn, this Regulation was 
coupled with Directive 2013/14/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 
amending Directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational 
retirement provision, Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and 
Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Funds Managers in respect of over-reliance on credit 
ratings. 
158 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 272/2012 of 7 February 2012 supplementing 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to fees charged 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority to credit rating agencies. 
159 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 446/2012 of 21 March 2012 supplementing 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory 
technical standards on the content and format of ratings data periodic reporting to be submitted to the 
European Securities and Markets Authority by credit rating agencies. 
160 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 447/2012 of 21 March 2012 supplementing 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies 
by laying down regulatory technical standards for the assessment of compliance of credit rating 
methodologies. 
161 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 448/2012 of 21 March 2012 supplementing 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory 
technical standards for the presentation of the information that credit rating agencies shall make available 
in a central repository established by the European Securities and Markets Authority. 
162 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 449/2012 of 21 March 2012 supplementing 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory 
technical standards on information for registration and certification of credit rating agencies. 
163 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 946/2012 of 12 July 2012 supplementing Regulation 
(EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to rules of procedure on 
fines imposed to credit rating agencies by the European Securities and Markets Authority, including rules 
on the right of defence and temporal provisions. 
164 See for instance Raquel García Alcubilla, Javier Ruiz del Pozo, Credit Rating Agencies on the 
Watch List: Analysis of European Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) and Panagiotis 
Staikouras, A Theoretical and Empirical Review of the EU Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies: In 
Search of Truth, Not Scapegoats, 21(2) Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 71 (2012); see also 
Siegfried Utzig, The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: A European Banking 
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as Article 1 of Regulation No 1060/2009 (as amended) explains, they try to «la[y] 
down conditions for the issuing of credit ratings and rules on the organisation and 
conduct of credit rating agencies, including their shareholders and members, to 
promote credit rating agencies' independence, the avoidance of conflicts of interest, 
and the enhancement of consumer and investor protection». Article 4, then, as 
amended by Regulation No 513/2011, makes it very clear that financial institutions 
«may use credit ratings for regulatory purposes only if they are issued by credit rating 
agencies established in the Union and registered in accordance with this Regulation», 
while the following articles are dedicated to outlining the criteria that a credit rating 
agency must comply with in order to qualify as an accepted one165. 
Finally, title III of Regulation No 1060/2009 outlines the details of the registration 
procedure mentioned in Article 4, and regulates supervision on the respect of the new 
rules, entrusted principally – after Regulation No 513/2011 – with the ESMA, which 
«shall charge CRAs fees» for these activities, according to Article 19166); Title IV deals 
mainly with the penalties for non-compliance. 
As should be evident, the approach followed by European legislators is completely 
ad odds with the one advocated for here: instead of encouraging competition and 
trusting the free market to deliver better ratings, some new powerful barriers to entry 
                                                                                                                                               
Perspective (ADBI Working Paper Series No. 188, January 2010). 
165 In fact, an updated list of registered and certified CRAs was published by ESMA on 20 March 
2013. A few months earlier, on 5 October 2012, the Commission had adopted three Decisions declaring 
respectively the US, the Canadian and the Australian «the US legal and supervisory framework for credit 
rating agencies shall be considered as equivalent to the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009», 
thus contributing to entrenching the existing oligopoly on a global scale. 
166 The details are outlined in the mentioned Regulation No 272/2012. 
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were raised, and then a remarkable regulatory effort was made in order to try to force 
CRAs to "behave". Something which is particularly critical to the stability of the 
market, given the importance that Basel rules, including Basel III, place on ratings. 
The regulators' approach looks quite contradictory: first they trust CRAs' judgments 
to an extremely great extent, and impose investors to rely on their assessment, but 
then they lose confidence in them, and feel the need to regulate every aspect of their 
conduct and approve of their very ability to operate167. No wonder, again, from our 
perspective, that the new rules are not working as hoped, and that still new ones keep 
being invoked, in the illusion that adding regulation to regulation would finally make 
the market work168. 
 
II.F DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES 
In order to avoid panic from spreading and turning into bank runs, both the US169 
                                                 
167 It was also quite contradictory of the Commission to "include a provision to reduce excessive 
reliance on credit ratings by removing from European Union laws all references to the need for ratings for 
regulatory purposes" (as reported by Stephen Castle, Europe Seeks to Reduce Debt Ratings' Influence, in 
The New York Times, 29 February 2012, p. B6: such rule would indeed strike with the very rationale 
behind the referenced Article 4 of Regulation No 1060/2009 and the whole new set of rules. 
168 Some proposals, such as the one made by Leonardo Domenici (the European Parliament rapporteur 
on the proposed amendments) are extremely illiberal, such as the one to forbid unsolicited reports on 
sovereign credit risk, or the one to create a public non-profit rating agency for sovereign credit risk 
assessment (see the press releases on the EP website of 19 June 2012, Credit rating agency reform: 
sovereign debt ratings to be regulated and Credit rating agencies to face tougher rules). But even when 
they try to encourage competition, they do it in a typical dirigiste and bureaucratic way: for instance, 
Domenici's proposals include the imposition of a 25% market-share limit for CRAs, or the Commission 
proposed to introduce the duty for companies to rotate rating agencies 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1355; the proposal was made also by the 
EU Finance Ministers, as reportd by James Kanter, Finance Ministers Clear Way for Credit Rating 
Competition in Europe, in The New York Times, 2 April 2012, p. B6. 
169 The insurance limit had been set at 100,000 dollars in 1980; s. 136 of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (Division A of An Act To provide authority for the Federal Government to 
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and the EU170 raised the threshold covered by their respective deposit insurance 
schemes. However, some differences emerged: "In the US, the crucial action took 
place at federal level. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) wound up 
insolvent banks when it could (450 have been liquidated since 2008, including large-
ish entities like Washington Mutual). Institutions considered too systemic to fail were 
recapitalised by a federal instrument, the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP). 
And depositors were backed by a US-wide protection scheme administered by the 
FDIC. [...] In the eurozone, by contrast, almost all the action took place at national 
level. Several consequences followed. Governments were slower to recognise (and 
spent a lot of time trying to conceal) the weakness of 'their' national banks. Fewer of 
these were wound up (a reflection of their crucial importance in local politics). When 
banks were recapitalised, individual states (like Ireland) were pushed into a sovereign 
debt crisis. And national deposit protection schemes could not prevent depositor 
                                                                                                                                               
purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and 
preventing disruption in the economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers, to amend the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend 
certain expiring provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other purposes, Pub.L. 110-
343, 122 Stat. 3765, October 3, 2008) raised that limit to 250,000 dollars until 31 December 2009; s. 204 
of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (Division A of An Act To prevent mortgage 
foreclosures and enhance mortgage credit availability, Pub.L. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632, May 20, 2009) 
extended the deadline to 31 December 2013; and then s. 343 of the Dodd-Frank Act made the increase to 
the 250,000 dollar-limit permanent. Under this latter section, the FDIC on 9 November 2010 provided for 
unlimited guarantee of noninterest-bearing transaction accounts between 31 December 2010 and 31 
December 2012 (with a Final Rule, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10076.pdf): however, according to Mark A. Calabria, 
Will Congress extend the ‘TAG’ Bank Bailout?, Cato@Liberty, 27 July 2012, the FDIC lacked any 
statutory authority to implement such a programme. 
170 Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 amending 
Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay 
mandated an increase of the minimum amount covered from the previous 20,000 euro to 50,000 and then 
100,000 by 31 December 2010. 
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flight from countries with weak sovereigns such as Greece"171. 
As for the EU, the proposal of establishing a EU-wide common deposit insurance 
scheme was brought forward in many policy discussions, for instance in a common 
report issued by the Presidents of the European Council, of the Commission, of the 
Eurogroup, and of the ECB172, that was the basis for discussion at the European 
Council of 28-29 June 2012173. Also due to continuing German opposition to such a 
scheme, so far the European Commission has only proposed to harmonize the existing 
rules, as part of the more comprehensive framework for banking resolution currently 
being negotiated, although a proposal they made provides for the establishment of a 
Fund that would effectively «serv[e] as a Euro area-wide insurance mechanism»174. 
Clearly, from the perspective advocated for in Part I, a common deposit insurance 
scheme is but a greater mistake: deposit guarantees are a great source of moral 
hazard, and it is also likely that they could never deliver to the expectations they raise 
into bank depositors, so they should arguably be abolished. A significant test of the 
                                                 
171 Philip Whyte, A banking union - it is necessary, but is it likely?, Centre for European Reform, 27 
July 2012. 
172 Report by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy (together with the Presidents 
of the Commission, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank), Towards a genuine economic and 
monetary Union, available at 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131201.pdf. 
173 European Council, Brussels, 29 June 2012, Conclusions, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf. 
174 There are two proposed pieces of legislation brought forward by the European Commission in this 
area, respectively the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of 6 June 2012, and the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a 
uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework 
of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 July 2013. 
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effectiveness of deposit schemes, and of how much they can actually be relied on, was 
offered by the financial crisis in Cyprus, culminated in the March 2013 bailout. As 
explained Detlev Schlichter, «events in Cyprus did not mark the death of democracy or 
the end of the euro but potentially the beginning of the end of deposit ‘insurance’»:175 
indeed, even though the final agreement eventually ruled out haircuts on deposits 
below the insured threshold, the first version of the EU-IMF agreement provided a 
6.7% haircut also on insured deposits, and it was just thanks to the failure by the 
Cypriot Parliament to ratify it (under pressure from street demonstrations in Nicosia 
and Russian government anger) that such blatant disregard of the deposit insurance 
was avoided. In spite of the above-mentioned attempts by the EU to establish a 
framework whereby bank resolutions are regulated in advance and do not need to be 
negotiated in the midst of a banking crisis, it might easily happen that a very serious 
crisis like the Cyprus one, but on a much larger scale, would lead to a significant 
haircut of deposits also below the insured threshold176. 
 
 
                                                 
175 Detlev Schlichter, Good riddance to deposit 'insurance', 27 March 2013, on detlevschlichter.com. 
176 There is also another point made by Frank Hollenbeck, Insuring Deposits, Ensuring Insolvency, 
Mises Daily, 24 July 2013: in case of a sovereign default of a Euro member, like Italy or Spain, the value 
of its debt «will drop significantly as Greek debt did back in 2010»: national banks holding great amounts 
of that debt «will go bankrupt instantly, and the Italian or Spanish governments will be on the hook for the 
deposits that served as funds to purchase their bonds since these deposits are insured! These governments 
will then have to print their way out of the problem. However, this would go against the ECB’s mandate 
and would probably face a German veto. A breakup of the Euro would then be inevitable. An official rate 
would then be set between Euros and liras or pesetas. This rate, however, would have nothing to do with 
the market rate. Depositors holding less than 100,000 euros would get their money back in liras or pesetas. 
However, this new currency would not be able to buy much. Deposit insurance guarantees the nominal 
value of deposits, not its real value: hence, the illusion of protection». 
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II.G EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
The enterprise of establishing a new institutional and regulatory framework in 
Europe, on the assumption that a more integrated economic and fiscal governance 
would make crises less likely, is a huge work-in-progress. 
Several pieces of legislation have been enacted, while many others have been 
proposed and are currently under examination by EU legislators. The underlying 
design seems to be the adoption of a series of steps towards a political and fiscal 
unification of Europe, an objective certainly not shared unanimously all over Europe, 
but strongly supported by European top bureaucrats and many prominent national 
European politicians. While the resistance by Northern European leaders has so far 
prevented the achievement of full integration, the measures already taken or agreed 
arguably try to pave the way towards such an outcome. Let us try to quickly review 
them, considering first some strictly institutional arrangements, then the mechanisms 
devised to provide financial support to troubled governments, and finally the new 
agreements concerning the surveillance of public finances and the fostering of 
economic growth across the EU. 
 
a) First of all, some important innovations were brought about by the Lisbon 
Treaty: some "provisions specific to Member States whose currency is the euro" were 
introduced in the TFEU (Articles 136 to 138), empowering the Council to adopt 
measures "(a) to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary 
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discipline; (b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them, while ensuring that they 
are compatible with those adopted for the whole of the Union and are kept under 
surveillance"; and a new Protocol to the TFEU was added (Protocol No. 14 on the Euro 
Group), stipulating that "The Ministers of the Member States whose currency is the 
euro shall meet informally. Such meetings shall take place, when necessary, to discuss 
questions related to the specific responsibilities they share with regard to the single 
currency. The Commission shall take part in the meetings. The European Central Bank 
shall be invited to take part in such meetings, which shall be prepared by the 
representatives of the Ministers with responsibility for finance of the Member States 
whose currency is the euro and of the Commission". 
Another innovation was brought about by the Ecofin, that on 7 September 2010 
established the so called "European Semester"177, an institutionalized mechanism to 
enhance coordination and supervision among EU members in the field of economic 
policy, aimed at helping the convergence among them and at "strengthen[ing] 
budgetary discipline, macroeconomic stability and growth"178. In the framework of the 
European Semester, both the Euro-plus Pact and the "six-pack" were agreed (on which 
see below). The European Semester was institutionalized by Regulation No. 
1175/2011179. 
On the institutional level, we shall also mention the European System of Financial 
                                                 
177 Council of the EU, Economic and Financial Affairs, Press release, 7 September 2010, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/116306.pdf. 
178 Ibidem. 
179 Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
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Supervisors, the new framework of authorities entrusted with the supervision of 
financial markets, that became operational between the end of 2010 and the 
beginning of 2011: it comprises the European Systemic Risk Board180; the three new 
European Supervisory Authorities181, i.e. the European Banking Authority182 (which 
replaced the Committee of Banking Supervisors), the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority183 (which replaced the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors), and the European Securities and 
Markets Authority184 (which replaced the Committee of European Securities 
                                                                                                                                               
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. 
180 Established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and 
establishing a European Systemic Risk Board; Article 3 explains that the ESRB "shall be responsible for 
the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the Union in order to contribute to the 
prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial stability in the Union that arise from developments 
within the financial system and taking into account macroeconomic developments, so as to avoid periods 
of widespread financial distress. It shall contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market and 
thereby ensure a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth". See also Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 of 17 November 2010 conferring specific tasks upon the European 
Central Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board. 
181 On top of the Regulations establishing them, see also Directive 2010/78/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 
2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC 
and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority). 
182 Established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), 
amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC. 
183 Established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/79/EC. 
184 Established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC. 
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Regulators); the Joint Committee of European Supervisory Authorities185; and the 
competent supervisory authorities in the Member States. 
Finally, the European Council of 28-29 June 2012, based on the already mentioned 
Report by the Presidents of the European Council, European Commission, Eurogroup 
and ECB, set the stage for a single European banking supervision, possibly to be 
entrusted to the ECB under Article 127(6) TFEU; work is still ongoing in this direction. 
 
b) With the progressive deterioration of public budgets in some eurozone 
countries, the need arose to set up a mechanism to provide assistance to these 
troubled governments186. As for Greece, a first round of help was provided via the 
Greek Loan Facility, a joint programme of the Euro area Member States and the IMF, 
respectively contributing 80 billion and 30 billion euro, whose coordination and 
management was entrusted to the European Commission. The details of the plan were 
outlined in a Council Decision of 10 May 2010187 and in a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Greek government, the IMF and the Commission on 
behalf of euro area Member States. 
But in order to help Ireland and Portugal, much stronger intervention was needed. 
                                                 
185 Established by Articles 54 and ff. of Regulations No 1093/2012, 1094/2010 and 1095/2010. 
186 Generally on some of these measures see Herbert Smith LLP, European financial stability 
measures and EU law (July 2010); see also European Commission, The EU as a borrower, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/index_en.htm, and Secretary-General of the European 
Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on borrowing 
and lending activities of the European Union in 2011, at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st13/st13064.en12.pdf. 
187 Council Decision of 10 May 2010 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening 
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In May 2010, two new coordinated instruments were created: the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism 
(EFSF). The former was "based on Art. 122.2 of the Treaty and an intergovernmental 
agreement of euro area Member States"188 and implemented with Council Regulation 
(EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation 
mechanism189; "[u]nder EFSM, the Commission is allowed to borrow up to a total of € 
60 billion in financial markets on behalf of the Union under an implicit EU budget 
guarantee. The Commission then on-lends the proceeds to the beneficiary Member 
State. This particular lending arrangement implies that there is no debt-servicing cost 
for the Union. All interest and loan principal is repaid by the beneficiary Member State 
via the Commission. The EU budget guarantees the repayment of the bonds through a 
p.m. line in case of default by the borrower"190. 
As for the well-known EFSF, "the representatives of the governments of the euro 
area member states adopted a decision to commit to provide assistance through a 
Special Purpose Vehicle that is guaranteed on a pro rata basis by participating member 
states in a coordinated manner and that will expire after three years, up to EUR 440 
billion, in accordance with their share in the paid-up capital of the European Central 
                                                                                                                                               
fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary 
to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2010/320/EU). 
188 Council of the EU, Economic and financial affairs, Extraordinary Council meeting Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Brussels, 9/10 May 2010, Press release, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/114324.pdf, p. 6. 
189 OJ EU L 118/1, 12.5.2010. 
190 European Commission, European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm/index_en.htm. 
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Bank and pursuant to their national constitutional requirements"191. 
The EFSF was created with the task of raising money, through the issuance of debt 
instruments (backed by a guarantee from euro-Member States proportionally to their 
shared of ECB paid-in capital), and then lending such money to governments of the 
eurozone in need of financial assistance, or using it to recapitalize banks or to 
purchase sovereign bonds. 
The EFSF (together with the EFSM, and also with the IMF) was soon employed 
essentially to bail out Ireland and Portugal, respectively in January and June 2011. This 
consumed part of the capital guarantee, but it was clear that the emergency was not 
over, with Greece looming on the verge of bankruptcy and investors starting to 
seriously worry for Spain and Italy too. Eurozone governments responded to this fresh 
emergency by increasing the EFSF guarantee commitments from the previous 440 
billion euro to around 780 billion, an amount corresponding to an effective lending 
capacity of 440 billion192. The enlargement was agreed upon with an international 
treaty, that required ratification by all signatory countries. Such process was 
particularly controversial in Slovakia, where the question was raised that the EFSF 
violated Art. 125(1) of the TFEU, i.e. the so called no-bailout clause introduced in the 
Treaties by the Maastricht Treaty. However, ratification was eventually accomplished 
in Slovakia too and the amended EFSF Framework came into force on 18 October 
                                                 
191 Council of the EU, Economic and financial affairs, Extraordinary Council meeting Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Brussels, 9/10 May 2010, Press release, p. 7 (the EFSF was agreed with a Decision of 
the Representatives of the Governments of the Euro Area countries of 10 May 2010 to set up the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) as a private company with euro states as shareholders). 
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2011. Soon after that, the EFSF was then used for a second bailout of Greece. 
Meanwhile, discussions had started to establish a permanent stabilisation 
mechanism: the EFSF and EFSM had indeed been established as temporary vehicles. In 
order to do that, an amendment to the Treaties was necessary: this was implemented 
by the European Council on 25 March 2011, under a simplified Treaty amendment 
procedure193. The amendment (whose ratification was completed only on 23 April 
2013) set the stage for a permanent stabilisation mechanism by adding a new 
paragraph to Article 136 TFEU, which stipulates that "The Member States whose 
currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of 
any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
conditionality"194. 
Based on such provision, on 1 February 2012 the governments of euro-Member 
States signed the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)195. The 
ESM “will perform the same activities as the amended EFSF: - issue bonds or other 
debt instruments on the market to raise the funds needed to provide loans to 
countries in financial difficulties; - intervene in the primary and secondary debt 
markets; - act on the basis of a precautionary programme; - finance recapitalisations 
                                                                                                                                               
192 See this document on the EFSF website: http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_en.pdf. 
193 European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose 
currency is the euro. 
194 See Bruno de Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability 
Mechanism (Sieps European Policy Analysis (June 2011), available at http://www.eui.eu/Projects/EUDO-
Institutions/Documents/SIEPS20116epa.pdf. 
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of financial institutions through loans to governments including in non-programme 
countries. At the euro area summit on 29 June 2012, it was proposed that once an 
effective supervisory mechanism is established for banks in the euro area, involving 
the ECB, the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to 
recapitalise banks directly”196. 
After the German Constitutional Court's ruling on 12 September 2012 dismissing a 
request for a preliminary injunction against its ratification197, Germany ratified (with 
reservations) the ESM Treaty on 27 September 2012 (followed on 4 October 2012 by 
Estonia, the only remaining State that had not ratified it yet), so now euro-Member 
States have in place a permanent system for assisting those financially troubled 
among them198 (the case on the merits has not been decided yet, but has lost 
relevance, now that ratification is completed). 
The ESM has a total subscribed capital of 700 billion euro, and an effective lending 
capacity of 500 billion; but its paid-in capital will be of 80 billion, provided by euro-
Member States in proportion to their ECB paid-in capital. As was explained by Bocconi 
Professor Roberto Perotti in an op-ed in the Italian financial daily Il Sole 24 Ore199, 
there is a crucial difference between the EFSF and the ESM: while they can loan a 
similar amount of money, around 500 billion euro, for Eurostat rules the EFSF loans 
                                                                                                                                               
195 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1406404/treaty_establishing_the_esm_2012_final.pdf. 
196 See this document on the EFSF website: http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_en.pdf. 
197 For some comments on this decision, see the Special Section The ESM Before the Court of the 
German Law Journal, vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 1-190. 
198 To be sure, a preliminary reference procedure from Ireland is pending before the Court of Justice 
of the EU, but the ECJ is highly unlikely to unsettle the ratification process. 
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qualify as public debt200, while the great majority of the ESM capital is just callable, so 
it only has to be paid-in contingently on needs, and is not required to be included in 
the calculation of the public debt. In this way, the commitment for the Member-States 
taxpayers is exactly the same, but the ESM allows governments to hide it to them, 
thanks to a loophole in Eurostat accounting rules. Currently, the ESM Chief has 
declared he is convinced that Greece will very likely need a third bailout201. 
In June 2013, the Eurogroup decided that the ESM will be given the power to 
directly recapitalise banks202; this innovation, clearly unhealthy for the financial 
system from the perspective of this article, will be one of the building blocks of the 
banking union, together with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (on which see below, 
§ II.I), the Single Resolution Mechanism (currently under a drafting process, but whose 
key elements were agreed in the Council of 27 June 2013203), and possibly, in the 
future, a common deposit insurance scheme. 
 
c) Measures were also taken in the field of economic and fiscal governance of the 
EU, aimed at consolidating sovereign budgets and stimulating European ailing growth. 
In particular, on 25 March 2011, the 17 euro-Member States plus Bulgaria, Denmark, 
                                                                                                                                               
199 Roberto Perotti, Quei debiti «fuori bilancio», in Il Sole 24 Ore, 24 luglio 2012. 
200 Eurostat, The statistical recording of operations undertaken by the European Financial Stability 
Facility (27 January 2011); see also the Background note, available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/documents/Background_
note_EFSF_27_January_2011.pdf. 
201 Stability Fund Chief Expects Third Greek Bailout, Spiegel Online International, 4 October 2013. 
202 See http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/436873/20130621-ESM-direct-recaps-main-
features.pdf and the FAQs on the ESM's website: 
http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQ%20Direct%20Bank%20Recapitalisation%20280620131.pdf. 
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Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania signed (under the EU Open Method of 
Coordination, and integrated in the European Semester) the so called Euro Plus 
Pact204. "The Pact commits signatories to even stronger economic coordination for 
competitiveness and convergence, also in areas of national competence, with 
concrete goals agreed on and reviewed on a yearly basis by Heads of State or 
Government"205. An important line of action is the commitment to implement a 
"common base" for corporate taxation. 
At the end of 2011, the EU also enacted the so called "six-pack", a set of five 
Regulations and one Directive206 – entered into force on 13 December 2011 – that 
"cover fiscal surveillance, but also macroeconomic surveillance under the new 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. In the fiscal field, the six-pack strengthens the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). According to the SGP Member States' budgetary 
                                                                                                                                               
203 See the press release 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/137627.pdf. 
204 See the conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro area of 11 March 2011, 
Annex I, A Pact for the Euro: Stronger Economic Policy Coordination for Competitiveness and 
Convergence, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/119810.pdf. 
205 European Commission, EU economic governance, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/index_en.htm. 
206 Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation (EU) No 
1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies, Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances, Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, Council 
Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member 
States. 
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balance shall converge towards the country-specific medium-term objective (MTO) – 
so-called preventive arm – and the general government deficit must not exceed 3% of 
GDP and public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP (or at least diminish sufficiently 
towards the 60% threshold). The six-pack reinforces both the preventive and the 
corrective arm of the Pact, i.e. the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which applies to 
Member States that have breached either the deficit or the debt criterion"207. 
Slightly after the approval of the "six-pack", the Commission already tried to 
supplement it with the proposal of two additional Regulations (the so called "two-
pack")208, "aimed at strengthening the surveillance mechanisms and promoting 
further economic integration and convergence in the euro area"209. After the approval 
by the European Parliament210, the "two-pack" entered into force on 30 May 2013. 
But the most relevant piece of legislation so far was the adoption on 2 March 2012 by 
all EU Member States except for the UK and the Czech Republic of the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union211. As was 
mentioned, the ESM Treaty entered into force on 27 September 2012 (and on 4 
                                                 
207 European Commission, Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? A short guide to the new EU fiscal 
governance, 14 March 2012. It is worth noting that under the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, the 
Commission has ruled that not only account deficits, but also account surpluses need to be reduced (at 
least if they exceed the 6% of GDP threshold), a view that is highly questionable though. 
208 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions 
for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area, COM(2011) 821 final; Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member 
States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the 
euro area, COM(2011) 819 final. 
209 European Commission, Economic governance: Commission proposes two new Regulations to 
further strengthen budgetary surveillance in the euro area, 23 November 2011. 
210 EU Parliament Approves Two-Pack Fiscal Rules but Sets Conditions, in The Wall Street Journal, 
13 June 2012. 
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October 2012 for Estonia).212 
The fiscal part of this Treaty is the so called Fiscal Compact. As explained by the 
European Commission, it “[r]equires contracting parties to respect/ensure 
convergence towards the country-specific medium-term objective (MTO), as defined 
in the SGP, with a lower limit of a structural deficit (cyclical effects and one-off 
measures are not taken into account) of 0.5% of GDP; (1.0% of GDP for Member States 
with a debt ratio significantly below 60% of GDP). Correction mechanisms should 
ensure automatic action to be undertaken in case of deviation from the MTO or the 
adjustment path towards it, with escape clauses for exceptional circumstances. 
Compliance with the rule should be monitored by independent institutions. These 
budget rules shall be implemented in national law through provisions of "binding force 
and permanent character, preferably constitutional". European Court of Justice (CoJ) 
may impose financial sanction (0.1% of GDP) if a country does not properly implement 
the new budget rules in national law and fails to comply with a CoJ ruling that requires 
it to do so. In the case of "euro-area Member States", sanctions would be channelled 
to the ESM, in the case of "non-euro-area Member States", the money would be 
attributed to the EU budget. Compliance with the rule implementing the MTO in 
national law will also be monitored at the national level by independent institutions. 
Other provisions aim at reinforcing the implementation of the Stability and Growth 
                                                                                                                                               
211 It is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1478399/07_-_tscg.en12.pdf. 
212 "TSCG will only be binding for all "euro-area Member States", while other contracting parties will 
be bound once they adopt the euro or earlier if they wish (they are allowed to choose provisions they wish 
to comply with)": European Commission, Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? A short guide to the new 
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Pact: re-statement of the debt rule set up by the six-pack, behavioural commitment 
reproducing RQMV among "euro-area Member States" when the Commission 
considers that an excessive deficit exists (formal modification of the voting rules would 
require a Treaty change). Finally, the TSCG sets stones for a reinforced surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies, with ex ante coordination of debt issuance 
plans among Contracting Parties and economic partnership programmes for Member 
States in EDP, which detail the structural reforms needed for an effective and durable 
correction of their excessive deficit. TSCG also includes a part on economic governance 
in the euro area, e. g.: Euro Summits at least twice a year; reinforced economic 
cooperation”213. 
Finally, in order to try to revive the struggling European economies, the European 
Council of 28-29 June 2012 also undertook a commitment of a 120 billion euro-worth 
"compact for growth and jobs". 
Overall, the actions by the EU and the Eurozone Member States in the area of fiscal 
and economic governance offer a mixed picture from the perspective shared here. 
Indeed the attempt to finally take the neglected Maastricht criteria more seriously and 
keep the public budget under control is surely to be praised, as is the push towards 
the adoption of constitutional rules mandating a balanced budget. However, it 
remains to be seen whether such rules will be taken seriously, and in fact the EU has 
already agreed to extend some countries' deadline for the reduction of their excessive 
                                                                                                                                               
EU fiscal governance. 
213 European Commission, Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? A short guide to the new EU fiscal 
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deficits, indicating that the old habits are not lost. 
Moreover, what seems utterly misguided in terms of policy is the decision to spend 
enormous amounts of (other countries') taxpayers' money in order to try to bail out 
bankrupt governments. Not only is this highly questionable from a moral point of 
view, but it does not even seem to be an effective approach, if one considers for 
instance how much Greece is struggling and how little it has accomplished in terms of 
the promised economic reforms, in spite of the hundreds of billions in bailout funds it 
has received. 
The other aspect to consider is that both the bailouts and the other actions taken 
by the European States seem to go down the road of the definitive fiscal and political 
unification of the continent: indeed the bailout funds tend to be granted in return for 
progressive withdrawal of sovereign powers214, and as we saw the European 
institutions also worked explicitly in the direction of tax policy harmonization215. 
The combined effect of these two trends is the coming closer of the political 
unification of the countries that will not decide to opt out: the current middle-way 
unification, where monetary policy is shared but fiscal and economic policies are not, 
and that – as we explained in § I.G – many consider to be one of the reasons of the 
                                                                                                                                               
governance. 
214 The redemption pact being discussed by EU authorities under proposal of the German Council of 
Economic Experts is another huge step in this direction (details are available at 
http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/schuldentilgungspakt.html?&L=1) 
215 Bagus, in the introduction to his The Tragedy of the Euro, pp. XVIII-XIX, goes as far as to argue 
that "[t]he project of the Euro has been pushed by European socialists to enhance their dream of a central 
European state" And he adds: "[b]ut the project is about to fail. The collapse is far from being a 
coincidence. It is already implied in the institutional setup of the EMU [...]. The story is one of intrigue, 
and economic and political interests. It is fascinating story in which politicians fight for power, influence 
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current turmoil, seems bound to be eventually overcome: either by a (maybe partial) 
break-up, or by closer unification. 
At first sight, the latter choice seems preferable for non-virtuous countries because 
foreign impositions currently appear to be the only realistic ways for them to achieve 
some fiscal discipline. From this perspective, even some prominent Austrian scholars – 
chiefly Huerta de Soto – have argued in defense of the euro216, praising it for its rigidity 
and for preventing undisciplined countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain to try to 
respond to the crisis by devaluing their currency, a false solution to their problems in 
which they have engaged for too long. 
However, the price to be paid for this advantage cannot be overlooked. That price 
is a further, at this point potentially irreversible, loss of sovereignty, given the massive 
transfer of power from the periphery to the centre, and from elected representatives 
to unelected, sometimes quasi-self-appointed bureaucrats. From this perspective, 
Gary North's severe critique of the euro (and of de Soto's defense of it)217 seems to be 
very much in point: in particular, such critique sounds persuasive when it exposes the 
highly constructivist nature of this enterprise and the great loss of self-determination 
powers that it has determined, and the even greater to come if one wants to keep the 
whole project alive, in order to avoid a painful return to national currencies, with the 
subsequent tremendous debasement that this would mean for essentially bankrupt 
countries like the so called 'PIGS'. 
                                                                                                                                               
and their own egos". 
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II.H MORE TAXATION, DEFICIT, DEBT, PUBLIC SPENDING... TO FINANCE BAILOUTS 
As should be fairly easy to predict from the analysis of the previous paragraphs, the 
actions taken by the US government and by most European countries determined a 
general increase of the tax rate, public deficits and debts, and public spending in 
general218: the frequent cries against an alleged austerity wave219 seem therefore 
highly overstated220; in fact, austerity is only partial and much smaller than what is 
often claimed221. 
A great amount of money was used for the bailouts, chiefly of Fannie and 
Freddie222 and of the financial223 and auto sectors224, in the US, and of banks and 
troubled governments, in the EU225. 
But especially in the US, a huge amount of money was spent also on a massive 
                                                                                                                                               
216 Jesús Huerta de Soto, An Austrian Defense of the Euro, Mises Daily, 22 June 2012. 
217 Gary North, Let the Euro Die... Soon, on Gary North's personal website (27 June 2012). 
218 See the detailed analysis by the European Commission, Report on Public finances in EMU 
(European Economy, 4/2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2012/pdf/ee-2012-4.pdf). 
219 See the debate between Veronique de Rugy (Show Me the ‘Savage’ Spending Cuts in Europe, 
Please in National Review Online, 7 May 2012, and The Debate over Austerity Continues, 8 May 2012) 
and Ryan Avent, Yes, there is austerity, in The Economist, 8 May 2012. A major source of 
misunderstanding is that the word 'austerity' is used to refer both to spending cuts and to tax increases, but 
the two are conceptually opposite types of measures: to be sure, three types of austerity can be identified: 
see Frank Hollenbeck, The Three Types of Austerity, Mises Daily, 4 September 2013. 
220 See for instance Martin Masse, Is “Austerity” Responsible for the Crisis in Europe?, Mises Daily, 
11 June 2013. 
221 See the series of posts by Juan Carlos Hidalgo for Cato@Liberty, respectively Looking at Austerity 
in Britain (9 May 2012), France (10 May 2012), Greece (14 May 2012), Italy (16 May 2012), Spain (31 
May 2012), and Portugal (2 July 2012). 
222 See § II.D. 
223 The Troubled Assets Relief Program implemented under the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008. 
224 David Shepardson, Treasury: U.S. to lose $25 billion on auto bailout, in The Detroit News, 13 
August 2012. 
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Keynesian stimulus plan to jump-start the economy, the $831 billion-worth American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)226. 
Clearly, such policies were completely unwise from a free-market perspective, 
because they inevitably perpetuated the distortions of the markets and created new 
formidable sources of malinvestment, rather than allowing the past malinvestments 
to simply liquidate and the economy to re-start on a sounder basis, without artificial 
stimuli. Not surprisingly, a 2012 study found compelling evidence that rescued banks 
were riskier than non-rescued ones both before and after the crisis and the 
subsequent rescue programmes227; in general, a very convincing argument can be 
made that, even when bailouts seem to have been harmless or even advantageous to 
taxpayers, this is just the appearance, but what is not seen – to use the famous 
Bastiat's words – is that bailouts inevitably consist in “the undermining of the rule of 
law, ... property confiscations, ... politically driven decisions and the distortion of 
market signals”228. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
225 See the previous paragraph. 
226 An Act Making supplemental appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure 
investment, energy efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal 
stabilization, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, and for other purposes, Pub.L. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115, February 17, 2009. 
227 Michael Brei, Blaise Gadanecz, Have public bailouts made banks’ loan books safer?, in BIS 
Quarterly Review, September 2012, 61-72. 
228 Daniel J. Ikenson, Bailouts Beget More Bailouts, USA Today, 16 June 2011. More deeply on the 
subject, see David A. Stockman, The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America 
(Public Affairs, New York 2013), especially Part I (The Blackberry Panic of 2008), 3-54; for a historical 
perspective, see Vern McKinley, Financing Failure: A Century of Bailouts (Independent Institute, 
Oakland 2011); but see also Barry Ritholtz (with Aaron Task), Bailout Nation: How Greed and Easy 
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II.I REGULATION 
A final issue for consideration is the actual flood of regulation, in its narrow sense, 
that has submerged financial markets in the wake of the crisis. In the US, this 
happened especially with the very well-known 848-page long Dodd Frank Act229. It is a 
huge set of new regulatory prescriptions230, pushing business offshore231, of dubious 
constitutionality232 and at odds with the rule of law233, on its turn giving rise to an even larger 
flow of implementing regulations234, whose underlying rationale is an attempt to 
regulate the financial sector in great detail, ending the alleged deregulation that in the 
legislators' view would have characterized the pre-crisis era, and would bear 
responsibility for originating the crisis235. 
The view advocated here is the opposite one: the markets (and financial ones in 
particular) were already highly regulated, with severe regulatory barriers to entry 
hindering competition, which prevented competitors from challenging the 
                                                                                                                                               
Money Corrupted Wall Street and Shook the World Economy (Wiley, Hoboken 2010). 
229 See the thorough analysis by David Skeel, The New Financial Deal. Understanding the Dodd-
Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences (Wiley, Hoboken 2011). 
230 Too big not to fail, in The Economist, 18 February 2012. 
231 The Wall Street Journal Review & Outlook, Dodd-Frank's Financial Outsourcing (7 November 
2012). 
232 A first case filed to challenge several titles of it (State National Bank of Big Spring Texas v. 
Geithner) was dismissed for lack of standing by the US District Court for the District of Columbia, but 
constitutional litigation was also brought still in the same court by several states in the US and by the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute: see details on their website, at http://cei.org/doddfrank. See also below, 
note 255. 
233 This is the convincing opinion of Roger Koppl, The Dodd-Frank Act versus the Rule of Law 
(NCPA Brief Analysis No. 775, October 2012). 
234 Jennifer Harper, Inside the Beltway: Dodd-Frank=5,320 pages, in The Washington Times, 7 May 
2012. 
235 A very interesting book on the misguided narrative about the crisis and how it led to this law is 
 Revista da Associação Mineira de Direito e Economia 
 
262 
 
incumbents' positions. The greatly misaligned incentives sent to the incumbents and 
encouraging a huge moral hazard from their part made it convenient to them to take 
on too much risk, relying on the fact that in any case they would not be allowed to 
fail236. 
Regulation tried to reduce this systemic risk that other forms of market 
interference had created, but in fact ended up making the situation worse, by 
reducing competition. The huge increase in regulatory burdens originating from Dodd-
Frank is therefore in our opinion a great mistake, a step in the opposite direction than 
the one that should have been followed. The record a few years into its adoption does 
not indeed seem satisfactory at all237. 
A typical example is the so called Volcker Rule, a regulation still being implemented 
based on s. 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act: such provision brings about Prohibitions on 
proprietary trading and certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity 
funds, and is usually described as an attempt to restore the regulatory framework in 
place between 1933 and 1999, respectively the dates when the separation between 
commercial and investment banks was mandated by the Glass-Steagall Act238, and when 
                                                                                                                                               
Peter J. Wallison, Bad History, Worse Policy: How a False Narrative About the Financial Crisis Led to 
the Dodd-Frank Act (AEI Press, Washington DC 2013). 
236 An interesting publication making such arguments is Vol. 32(3) of Economic Affairs, entitled 
Financial Regulation: The Need for a Revolution (Institute of Economic Affairs, London 2012). 
237 See for instance Louise C. Bennetts, Dodd-Frank: Discretion in an Age of Uncertainty, in Jurist, 
January 11, 2013. 
238 Glass-Steagall Act is the colloquial designation for the Banking Act of 1933 when such measure is 
referred to (An Act to provide for the safer and more effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate 
interbank control, to prevent the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for other 
purposes, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, June 16, 1933). 
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such mandatory separation was formally repealed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act239: again, in the absence of all 
the rules on deposit guarantees, and of the unwritten bailout promises, that we have 
seen, the market would arguably take care of keeping banks' size to a manageable 
dimension, so that they would not grow too big to fail. Therefore also the very 
complicated Volcker Rule appears at best redundant240. 
The trend does not seem very different in Europe. To be sure, the EU has not 
passed a single piece of legislation as incredibly long and detailed as Dodd-Frank, but 
rather fragmented its intervention into a very high number of legislative and 
regulatory acts (some of which were discussed in § II.G). Perhaps the most striking 
example are the short selling bans and restrictions that many EU Member States 
quickly passed (and repeatedly renewed) in the moments of worse panic on the 
markets241. On top of the single Member States' on-the-spot regulations, a 
comprehensive set of restrictions on uncovered short sales and sovereign bonds was 
enacted by the EU with the Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit 
                                                 
239 Or Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, (An Act to enhance competition in the financial 
services industry by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, and 
other financial service providers, and for other purposes, Pub.L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, November 12, 
1999). 
240 The same conclusion applies to most innovations brought about by Dodd-Frank, such as the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, highly criticized by Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper 
Series 12-50, electronic copy available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130942, 
forthcoming in the George Washington Law Review. 
241 See, among the most recent works on the subject, Greg N. Gregoriou (ed.), Handbook of Short 
Selling (Elsevier 2012); Imad Moosa, The regulation of short selling: A pragmatic view, 13 J. Banking 
Reg. 211 (2012). 
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default swaps242. 
From our perspective, trying to restrict short selling and CDSs amounts exactly to 
outlawing a thermometer in order to conceal a fever: not only is this completely 
ineffective in curing the disease, it actually contributes to underestimating it, thus 
making it worse and increasing the danger. Along these lines were also the conclusions 
of a paper published in a certainly not Austrian-lining venue, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance243. 
But several other new sets of rules were passed over the last few years, such as the 
new regulations of the over-the-counter derivatives244, the new rules on short 
selling245, or the ones on the bankers' bonus cap246. 
The most important pieces of legislation so far are probably the ones constituting 
                                                 
242 OJ EU L 86/1, 24.3.2012. See also the drafts of two Commission Delegate Regulations (EU), 
respectively supplementing Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps with regard to definitions, the calculation of net 
short positions, covered sovereign credit default swaps, notification thresholds, liquidity thresholds for 
suspending restrictions, significant falls in the value of financial instruments and adverse events, and 
supplementing Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on short 
selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps with regard to regulatory technical standards for the 
method of calculation of the fall in value for liquid shares and other financial instruments. 
243 Robert Battalio, Hamid Mehran, Paul Schultz, Market Declines: What Is Accomplished by 
Banning Short-Selling?, in 18(5) Current Issues in Economics and Finance (Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci18-5.pdf. 
244 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR), followed by a substantial body of 
implementing regulations. 
245 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 March 2012 on 
short selling and certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps, followed by Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 827/2012 of 29 June 2012, and Commission Delegated Regulations (EU) No 
826/2012, 918/2012, and 919/2012. 
246 See in particular Article 94 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with EEA relevance; but the regulatory framework is much more 
complex,  resulting from intertwining national and EU  subsequent rounds of provisions, started in 2010. 
The UK is anyway fighting the cap on before the ECJ. 
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the Single Supervisory Package: in September 2012, the European Commission 
proposed indeed a Single Supervisory Mechanism, and in July 2013 it coupled it with 
the proposal of a Single Resolution Mechanism: such steps were meant to achieve the 
so called banking union, i.e. a legal framework whereby the rules on the supervision 
and the resolution of banks are written and implemented at the EU level, rather than 
at the Member State level. Between September and October 2013, the Parliament and 
the Council definitively approved the Single Supervisory Mechanism package247, that is 
set to become fully operational in November 2014, entrusting the most important 
supervisory tasks on the banking sector to the ECB. As all the attempts to centralize 
regulation, this one too does not seem a wise policy option: it would arguably be 
much better to disentangle the very strong relationship between banks and their 
respective sovereign states, a given that supporters of the banking union seem to take 
for granted, and then use as one of the main arguments in favour of a common 
supervisory scheme248. 
A new regulatory framework was also passed with the so called Capital 
Requirements Directive IV package, i.e. a Directive and a Regulation249, entered into 
                                                 
247 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, and 
Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
248 See a clear example of this way of reasoning in an FT op-ed by Unicredit global chief economist 
Erik F. Nielsen, Banking union is critical for eurozone, in Financial Times, 4 September 2012. 
249 Respectively Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC 
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force on 17 July 2013, implementing the Basel III standards and including other rules 
on banking regulation, the most remarkable of which is a new cap on bankers' 
bonuses, effective since 2014. 
 
II.J A PERSISTENT FAILURE 
In Part I, we argued that the pre-crisis regulatory picture was a highly regulated 
scenario, and that this vast amount of regulation in place before the crisis was not 
helpful at all in preventing it; to be sure, it even made it worse, when it did not 
outright contribute to originating it. Arguably, the lesson to draw from the crisis was 
therefore to massively reduce the amount of interference with the markets and of 
regulation in its narrow sense, and let the markets more free to achieve their 
"spontaneous order"250. 
Unfortunately from our perspective, the view that has prevailed both within 
academic and intellectual circles, and in the political and regulatory environment, is 
quite the opposite: the crisis was allowed, if not directly caused, by a lack of sufficient 
reigning of the markets, that have demonstrated to cause disasters when left 
unabridged. 
Consistently with this analysis, the clear trend both in the US and in the EU, that we 
have observed in Part II, has been towards a substantial increase in the amount of 
                                                                                                                                               
and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012. 
250 See above, note 3. 
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"regulation" (both in its broad and narrow meaning), even though the general 
consensus among politicians, bureaucrats, economists and commentators seems to be 
that all this is still largely insufficient. 
But what should have been instead, in concreto, the approach to follow in a more 
free-market oriented perspective? Even without going as far as advocating for a 
complete deregulation of financial markets, as well as of any other economic field, a 
tremendous step forward would have been the choice to follow Friedrich von Hayek's 
lesson in his Rules and Order, the first volume of his Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
The regulatory framework existing before the crisis, and even more so the one built 
as a response to it, are indeed expressions of what Hayek identified as a “made order 
or taxis”251, as opposed to the cosmos, a spontaneous order arising from the multiple 
free interactions of individuals and firms. Taxis corresponds to thesis, namely "the law 
of legislation", while cosmos corresponds to nomos, namely "the law of liberty", the 
law originating from society, from facts, from custom, and not from a legislator's (or a 
regulator's) command. 
Financial markets regulation was indeed dominated by the "law of legislation", a 
law that predetermines the goals and desired outcomes of the market process (e.g., 
avoiding the bankruptcy of too big too fail firms) and tries to influence the behaviour 
of economic and social actors in order to achieve them. 
                                                 
251 Friedrich von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, volume I (Rules and Order) (The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 1973), p. 42. But see also Hayek's reflection on the rule of law in The 
Constitution of Liberty. 
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On the wave of economic emergency252, such "law of legislation" has completely 
marginalized spontaneous law, the one that includes among its fundamental principles 
the one of responsibility, according to which it is necessary that the negative 
consequences of any action (such as buying stocks or bonds of a bank or lending it 
money in the form of bank "deposits" or purchasing sovereign bonds or taking up a big 
mortgage or granting that mortgage) are borne by the one(s) who committed it. 
From this perspective, a desirable law is therefore one that outlines a framework of 
general and abstract rules, without predetermining the outcome to achieve, and let 
the "game" be played freely, relying on the benefits of competition. Instead 
legislators, regulators and central banks pose very specific objectives: economic 
growth, full employment, "moderate" price inflation, prevention of bankruptcies, and 
so forth. But by doing this, even when such objectives can be agreed with (which is in 
no way necessarily so), they do not realize that they often produce an opposite 
outcome to their desired one: the typical example are regulations meant to prevent 
bankruptcies, that create the incentives for moral hazard and end up increasing the 
likelihood of such events. 
In such a picture, originally tainted by the "fatal conceit"253 of knowing which are 
the right goals to pursue and of possessing the ability to adequately plan human 
behaviour so as to achieve them, even repealing some regulations – something that 
                                                 
252 On this aspect, see Todd J. Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts, and the Rule of Law, 
35(1) Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 1 (2011). 
253 The Fatal Conceit is the title of Hayek's work of 1988 (edited by William W. Bartley III) 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1988). 
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would be per se highly desirable from the perspective here advocated – can in fact 
have very negative consequences. 
For instance, let us consider what happened with the repeal of the mandatory 
separation between commercial and investment banks, that had been imposed by the 
so called Glass-Steagall Act: such regulation had a very clear benefit in a system where 
banks were de facto prevented from going bankrupt and where a deposit insurance 
scheme was in place, and it was therefore necessary to limit the incentive, arising 
from such elements, to undertake risky behaviours that could threaten systemic 
stability. Repealing such command, while at the same time maintaining the promise of 
bailout and deposit guarantees has not been a wise choice of policy, and can in fact be 
considered one of the reasons of the crisis. However, the real problem was not 
deregulation per se, yet deregulation under the existence of other rules (typically 
expression of the "law of legislation") that induce moral hazard and opportunistic 
behaviours. 
Therefore a closer look reveals that the truly desirable medium-to-long-run 
solution would not be to reinstate a similar regulation (or anyway move towards that 
direction, as is being done with the implementation of the so called Volcker rule), 
while maintaining the other rules (obstacles to bankruptcy and deposit insurance), 
because in this way the business model of banks is predetermined, falling into the law-
with-a-goal, i.e. into the thesis. Instead, it is preferable to eliminate also those other 
rules, so as to re-establish a proper functioning of the market. 
On a different but linked level, the timid and partial shift from the heavy 
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manipulation of the markets described in the first part, that is being implemented as a 
result of Basel III rules and the subsequent deleveraging, can have negative short-term 
consequences on real economy. However, the responsibility for the shocks on the real 
economy does not lie with the decision to start reducing slightly the manipulation, but 
with manipulating (too much) in the past. As with any drug, monetary "drug", as soon 
as one stops taking it, produces an abstinence syndrome, that can be extremely 
painful: but blaming it on the fact that the addicting substance is no longer taken is a 
mistake, because it looks only at the last stage, overlooking that the problem was in 
fact the previous prolonged taking of the drug. 
And exactly the same holds true for the austerity policies, on which controversies 
infuriate both in academia and on the press. Even though one can actually find a push 
towards austerity in the crisis-hit countries – which is debatable254 –, it is plausible 
that this might have partially recessive consequences in the short-run: but also in this 
case, this does not seem a good reason to procrastinate with policies that have made 
public debts sky-rocket, and to give up discontinuing them. 
A final point to be made is that repealing the regulations that we have criticized – 
both pre-dating and following the crisis – would not at all create a framework without 
rules or even law, or that legendary "far west" scenario, arguably a rather disparaging 
and oversimplifying picture. In fact, deregulating, and in particular repealing 
regulations establishing or legalizing central banking, legal tender, deposit guarantees, 
fractional reserve banking, as well as those distorting investment choices of banks or 
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the whole markets for credit rating and housing, as well as those responsible for the 
huge existing public debts of crisis-hit countries and the great amount of regulations in 
the narrow sense255, would actually lead to a scenario where rules and law regain the 
leading role they deserve in a functioning free-market, taking the form of nomos in the 
hayekian meaning. In other words, slashing the "law of legislation" by no means 
implies cutting down on law tout-court: in fact, it restores law in its highest and 
historically predominant meaning, the "law of liberty". 
The challenge for law in the face of the crisis seems therefore to be to renounce to 
pre-determine the goal and the outcome of the economic process, whose evolutions 
(including reactions to alterations of cosmos by taxis) it is impossible to predict and 
plan, and rather concentrate on ensuring the respect of the essential principles of the 
nomos, among which the principle of responsibility and the principle of unhindered 
competition are particularly relevant. 
In this enterprise, constitutional law has a crucial role to play256, in its original 
meaning of an instrument to constrain the power, to limit the government's aspiration 
to determine at its own will the outcome of spontaneous social interactions. On its 
turn, constitutional adjudication and in particular the judicial review of legislation are 
                                                                                                                                               
254 See above, notes 218 to 220. 
255 See the agenda drawn by Lawrence H. White, Financial Regulation. An Agenda for Reform, in The 
Milkanen Institute Review (First Quarter 2009), 15-25. 
256 See the reflections by Matthias Ruffert, The European debt crisis and European Union law, 48(6) 
Common Market Law Review 1777 (2011); more recently, see on this topic Xenophon Contiades (ed.), 
Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparative Analysis (Ashgate, Farnham 2013). As 
regards specifically Dodd-Frank, see C. Boyden Gray and John Shu, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
& Consumer Protection Act of 2010: Is It Constitutional?, 11(3) The Journal of the Federalist Society’s 
Practice Group, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20101209_BoydenShuDoddFrankWP.pdf 
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called to quickly remedy the violations of such limits, without bowing to pressures 
from governments on the grounds of Realpolitik: for instance, the German 
Constitutional Court was right to make it very clear, in its famous Maastricht Urteil, 
that the EMU had to be meant normatively as a "stability community"257, with the 
consequence that Germany could leave it in case that goal were not achieved258. It 
would be equally appreciable if the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in its upcoming 
decisions on the merits on the legitimacy of the ESM Treaty, the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, and the OMT 
programme, were again so brave to halt or at least impose strict conditions on the 
ratification, especially as regards the aspects concerning the breach of the property 
rights arising from the strong inflationary threats posed by the ESM. 
Admittedly, constitutional justices do not always have the remedies necessary to 
guarantee the enforcement of fundamental principles, whose violations risk to go 
unpunished. The analysis touched upon several examples of this kind: let us think of 
the Maastricht-Stability and Growth Pact criteria, whose violation was never punished; 
or of the Fiscal Compact, that does not seem to include credible mechanisms to make 
the difference from this point of view; or of the prohibition for the ECB to finance 
Member States' public debts, substantially violated with the Securities Markets 
Programme, and yet met with a general relief and praise from troubled governments 
                                                                                                                                               
(see also above, note 231). 
257 BVerfGE 89, 155, 2 BvR 2134/92, 2159/92, 12 October 1993, §§ 138 ff. 
258 See Mathias Herdegen, Monetary Union as a permanent community based on the rule of law 
(EMU Watch No. 52, 23 July 1998), pp. 3-4. 
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and their public opinions, due to the exceptional emergency of the situation259. 
But let us consider also the enumerated powers in Article I, section 8 of the 
American Constitution: under the Tenth Amendment, Congress's powers should not 
go beyond such list, and yet only very few authors and political figures argue that the 
very existence of the Fed and of its monopoly over money – since they exorbitate 
from that list (something per se impossible to deny) – are illegitimate260. 
It would be urgent to face this problem and look for possible solutions. 
Unfortunately, as we saw the governments and the monetary authorities have been 
going in the opposite direction. On the one hand, some fundamental principles are 
reaffirmed, as with the Fiscal Compact, though again without taking care of 
establishing adequate mechanisms for their enforcement; on the other, financial 
markets are flooded with a new tsunami of thesis, from Dodd-Frank to Basel III 
reforms to the new Eurozone and EU regulations, thus going all the more farther from 
a legal order sufficiently clear and enduring, namely from the cosmos. 
Our concern is that this lays the foundations for new unbalances, new crises that 
on their turn result in even more thesis and taxis, in a spiral very difficult to break and 
potentially fatal to the very survival of the market and of an economic system based 
on freedom. Facing such a scenario, the only option for scholars and all individuals 
concerned with the protection of freedom seems to be to denounce the great risks 
                                                 
259 Another observation by Hayek looks quite prescient here: "'[e]mergencies' have always been 
pretext on which the safeguards of individual liberty have been eroded" (The Political Order of a Free 
People [volume III of Law, Legislation and Liberty], The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1979, p. 
124). 
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involved in the approach currently dominating, demand a rethinking of it, and 
resolutely defend the reasons of nomos and cosmos, i.e. the reasons of "law" in its 
noblest meaning. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
260 The Tenth Amendment Center is the most active group on this issue 
(http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/). 
